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Map over central Rio de Janeiro. The dots show the (approximate) locations of the favelas I mention 
throughout this thesis. From http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/south-america/brazil/rio-de-janeiro/  
Black= Rocinha  Orange= Vidigal Red= Cantagalo  Green= Santa Martha
 
Picture taken from my home in Rocinha, portraying the favela and the contrast to the neighboring middle-class 
neighborhood of São Conrado. 
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According to a UN-Habitat report from 2008, Brazilian cities have the biggest disparities in 
income distribution in the world (UN-Habitat 2008: 70). Few places is this as obvious as in 
Rio de Janeiro, where the urban development has been characterized by a fragmentation or 
dualization of the socio-political space between the formal city and the urban informal 
settlements known as favelas. Simply defining favelas is difficult. In English texts, the word 
is often translated as “slum” or “shantytown”, with little explanation as to what that actually 
means in the Brazilian context. The definition used by the municipality in the 2011 Master 
Plan
1
 of sustainable urban development is as follows:  
“An area predominantly used for housing, characterized by the occupation of lands by 
a low-income population, precarious urban infrastructure and public services, narrow 
pathways with irregular alignments, lots of irregular size and shape, and unlicensed 
constructions in violation with the legal patterns.”2 
Because of the difficulty in finding an English word that covers all of the connotations of a 
favela, I will refer to the informal settlements as favelas throughout this thesis.  
According to The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE 2010) 22% of the 
population of Rio de Janeiro today live in favelas. Throughout their history, the favelas have 
been rejected by the “formal” city and have continually been threatened by destruction 
(Perlman 2010: 26). The public did not formally acknowledge the favelas, symbolically 
exemplified by refusing to mark them on maps of the city where they remained as blank 
spaces until the 1980’s. As the favelas were constructed as opposing entities to the official 
city in the public imaginary, so were their inhabitants. The favelados, pejorative for the 
people inhabiting these territories, have been perceived as intimately linked to all the 
problems associated with the favelas. When the drug trafficking emerged in Rio de Janeiro in 
the 1980’s and found a stronghold in the favelas, regular residents within these territories 
were considered as accomplices of the drug traffickers because of neighborhood relations, 
kinship or economic and political ties. In the public imaginary, there were no innocents in the 
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 The Master Plan (Plano Diretor) lays down the guidelines for the urban development of the city. 
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 Available at: http://www2.rio.rj.gov.br/smu/compur/pdf/LC111_2011_PlanoDiretor.pdf Last accessed May 
13th 2013.  
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favelas. The police took a militarized approach to combating the drug trafficking, and the 
social conflict in the city became formulated as a “war”. This discourse of war against the 
drug factions has maintained and reproduced stereotypical notions of the favelas as inherently 
violent, creating and simultaneously justifying specific forms of state management of these 
territories and their populations while reproducing dynamics of segregation in the city (Leite 
2012: 375). 
In recent years, Brazil has experienced strong economic growth and is now the world's sixth 
largest economy (Inman 2012). Under the leadership of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma 
Rouseff and the center-left PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) administration the last decade, 
Brazil has received international attention for major oil discoveries, stable economic and 
political governance and a growing middle class. The federal government has chosen to invest 
heavily in infrastructure, logistics and welfare measures to ensure stable economic growth in 
the future.  
After it was announced that Brazil and Rio de Janeiro were to host the Soccer World Cup in 
2014 and the Olympics in 2016, the country has placed itself in the international spotlight. 
This represents opportunities for increased trade, investments and economic growth, and the 
ability to distinguish itself as a major political and economic actor. It however also demands 
that Rio de Janeiro confronts the statistics where it exhibits poor rankings, such as indicators 
on crime, violence and inequality. The favelas represent a pressing image of these issues in 
the city. The hard-hand policies of the police interventions in the favelas within the discourse 
of war had proved incapable of reducing the levels of crime and were losing political 
legitimacy. In order to improve the security situation in Rio de Janeiro before the international 
sport events a new public security program called the pacification program (Unidades de 
Polícia Pacificadora or Police Pacifying Units/UPPs), was developed in 2007.  
The pacification program is based on the following goals: i) take back state control over 
communities currently under strong influence of ostensibly armed criminals ii) give back to 
the local population peace and public safety, which are necessary for the full exercise and 
development of citizenship
3
 and iii) contribute to breaking with the logic of “war” that now 
exists in Rio de Janeiro. It does not have among its objectives to i) end drug trafficking ii) end 
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 exercício e desenvolvimento integral da cidadania. 
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criminality iii) be a solution for all communities or iv) turn itself into the panacea for all 
socio-economic problems in the community (Henriques and Ramos 2011: 243).  
As a contrast to the offensive police interventions of before, the program relies on the 
permanent placement of Police Pacifying Units in the communities, and by 2016, 40 UPP 
units will be installed covering approximately 200 of Rio de Janeiro's 1,000 plus favelas.
4
 
Through combining security with urban upgrading interventions and increased access to 
social services, the program aims to bridge the gaps between the favelas and the rest of the 
city. The underlying logic is that peace and public safety are preconditions for the exercise 
and development of citizenship. The question is how and whether this process is representing 
an approximation process between the highly segregated territories within the city.  
1.2 Research Questions 
Questions of citizenship and security have been intimately linked throughout the history of 
Rio de Janeiro. The favela residents have been constructed as a threat, as non-citizens, in the 
public imaginary and have therefore not had access to the same rights and services as other 
inhabitants of the city. The Pacification program is promoted as a new approach to 
governmental interventions in the favelas; combining proximity policing and infrastructural, 
social and economic projects in order to bridge the gaps between segregated territories and 
populations. Both the residents and the government hope the pacification can represent an 
approximation process between the “pacified” favelas and the “asphalt”, which the formal city 
is often called as a contrast to the narrow, unpaved pathways of the favela. What is meant by 
approximation is however not given and depends on who talks about it and what interests are 
at stake.  
I want to look at what the pacification means in practice; in the everyday life in the areas that 
are occupied and in the perceptions of the diverse actors that are affected and/or involved, to 
evaluate what kind of approximation process the pacification program produces. I take as a 
starting point the objectives of the pacification program to take back the state monopoly of 
power, bring peace and public safety to the communities, break with the logic of war and 
promote the exercise and development of citizenship. I see these as interrelated aspects within 
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the larger objective to promote an approximation process of segregated territories within the 
urban fabric.  
The pacification process is a project in the making, and it is too early to say what it will mean 
for the urban integration in the long run. What we can say something about today, however, 
is:  
1. How do the residents of a pacified favela as of today consider the program and its 
effects on security and on their sense of citizenship? 
2. Does the pacification program in their eyes represent a step towards inclusion of the 
favela and its residents in the city on more equal terms?  
As such, the interrelationship between security and inclusive citizenship promoted by the 
pacification as of today is the topic for this thesis. 
1.3 Methods 
According to Thagaard (2009: 11) the validity of the results of a research project depends on 
whether the foundation for the knowledge gathered is made explicit. This introduction chapter 
will present the data-gathering method, the process of analysis and the interpretative 
framework that underlie the results presented in order to meet the standard of constructing 
validity. 
1.3.1 Research method 
There are a variety of methods available to conduct social research, of which the distinction 
between qualitative and quantitative studies is an important divide. Neuman (2000 cited in 
Thagaard 2009: 17) depicts the difference between quantitative and qualitative studies as the 
difference between studies of variables relatively independent of social context compared to 
an interpretation of processes in relation to the social context they are part of. Qualitative 
research is by definition exploratory, and intent to do an in-depth portrait of the topic of 
interest. There are an extensive number of qualitative designs available to the researcher, 
corresponding to the different topics and questions at the base of the research.  
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According to Yin (2009: 2), case studies are the preferred method of research when i) how 
and why-questions are being posed; ii) the investigator has little control over events; and iii) 
when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context. Case study 
research is a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a bounded system (a 
case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time through detailed, in-depth data collection 
involving multiple sources of evidence (Stake 2005: 246). Historically they have been 
considered a “soft” form of research, being prejudiced because of the lack of rigor of case 
study research which can allow equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the direction 
of the findings. Case study research has also been criticized for taking too long, resulting in 
massive, unreadable documents providing little basis for scientific generalization (Yin 2009: 
15). In spite of these concerns, case studies can provide valuable information in terms of 
investigating contemporary events in depth and within their real-life context, combining 
multiple sources of evidence in a way that provides holistic insights. As long as the researcher 
is aware of the many potential pitfalls and make a clear outline on how the data has been 
gathered and analyzed, a case study is a valuable method for exploratory research. 
 The selection of the case 
There are several variations within case studies as a research method. Firstly, there are both 
single and multiple case studies (Yin 2009: 19). According to Stake (2005: 247) case studies 
may also be distinguished by the intent of the case analysis. He distinguishes between 
intrinsic and instrumental case studies. With the former, the focus is on the case itself because 
it presents an unusual or unique situation that is worth investigating. With instrumental cases, 
on the other hand, the researcher focuses on an issue of concern and selects one or several 
bounded cases to illustrate this issue. My research can be seen as a single instrumental case 
study. My starting point was to investigate the current transformations in security policy and 
urban management in Rio de Janeiro and how it plays out in a localized setting.  
There are many favelas that could have been interesting to choose as my case. Vila 
Autódromo, Morro da Providência, Manguinhos and the Aldeia da Maracanã are examples of 
communities that are seeing more direct impacts of the forced removals and overstepping of 
the institutional framework of human and civil rights related to the process of preparing Rio 
de Janeiro for the upcoming mega-events. These are just a few examples of other cases that 
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could have given valuable insights in the ongoing processes. I however chose the community 
of Rocinha as my case, and did so because of various reasons.  
The case 
Rocinha is situated on a mountainside in the Sona Zul, the central part of the city, between 
some of the most expensive neighborhoods of the city. The latest census from 2010 
determined that Rocinha has approximately 70,000 residents (IBGE 2010), however, the 
residents themselves believe there are up to 150-200,000 inhabitants. It is the biggest favela in 
Rio de Janeiro and Brazil, and one of the biggest in Latin America.  
Rocinha was occupied by the military police in November 2011, and the UPP was officially 
inaugurated almost a year after, September 20
th
 2012. I chose Rocinha as my case because of 
the timing of my field work; I was there for the one year occupation of the territory, which 
was an interesting timing. Rocinha also has symbolical value in terms of being the largest 
favela in the city and playing a central role in the social imaginary as it was the center of the 
cocaine trade led by the city’s perhaps most famous drug lord, Nem, the last six years before 
the pacification. Finally and maybe most importantly, is the fact that I had not come across 
any extensive research done on the pacification of Rocinha.  
Data gathering methods 
Case studies as a qualitative research method rely on multiple sources of evidence, 
converging data in a triangular fashion (Yin 2009: 114-116). Yin (2009: 101) distinguishes 
six sources of evidence in case study research; documents, archival records, interviews, direct 
observations, participant observations, and physical artifacts. The various sources of evidence 
are highly complementary, and a good case study will therefore want to combine multiple 
sources of evidence. My data is a combination of direct and participatory observations, 
interviews and a collection of various other sources of material such as documents, 
documentaries, newspaper cuttings and statistics. I will specify some of the rewards and 
challenges of these different types of data below.  
To gather the material I conducted a three month long field work from October 2012 to 
January 2013. This thesis is based on Thagaard’s (2009: 65) definition of fieldwork as the 
phase of the research process where the researcher leaves the research institute and goes into 
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“the field”. Based on this conception of fieldwork, it becomes clear that the fieldwork is not a 
choice of method; rather, it is a phase of the research project.  
Except for two weeks in Copacabana in the beginning of my stay, I lived in Rocinha during 
the extension of my fieldwork. In addition to giving me insights and information I otherwise 
would not have been able to obtain, I felt that living in the community gave me increased 
legitimacy as a researcher; it felt like people saw that I was genuinely interested in their 
perspective and more willing to share their experiences than if I had just came for the day. 
According to Ragin and Amoroso (2011: 46) the fact that the researcher places him or herself 
in the situation of the informants can be valuable in itself in the sense that the informants feel 
they have a voice that is worth listening to. Certainly, the idea that living there was “less 
exploitative” than not living there might be just a personal feeling rather than a well-grounded 
scientific argument. I had little to offer in return for the time, effort and patience of the people 
of Rocinha who invited me into their homes and lives. Therefore I felt the least I could do was 
to show them that I did have a genuine interest in getting to know their perspective, and I felt 
that the only way to do so was to participate in the local reality full time.  
My entrance to the community was through a woman I had met when I lived in Rio de Janeiro 
in the beginning of 2012. She proved to be a valuable informant. Well-known in the 
community, she and her family gave me the initial entry, helping me to find a place to live in 
a relatively safe area, and introducing me to the community and some key actors. Later on I 
used the so-called snowball method (Johannessen 2010: 109) to get in touch with more 
residents. As I speak Portuguese, I was able to integrate well with the local residents and 
avoided potential biases and things that might be lost in translation if I had used an 
interpreter.  
Direct and participatory observation; informal conversations 
Participatory observation is a mode of observation in which the researcher is not merely a 
passive observer; instead, he or she might assume a variety of roles within a case study 
situation and might participate in the events being studied (Yin 2009: 111). Throughout my 
time in Rocinha, I was observing and participating in the daily life and activities of the 
residents. I participated in events, reunions and meetings, did my shopping in the local stores 
and produce markets, and went to family dinners, birthday parties and concerts. I soon 
realized that the most valuable information was to be found in informal interactions at 
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unexpected moments. I moved to Rocinha because I wanted to experience first-hand the daily 
life and challenges of living in a favela, and was rewarded with insights that I probably never 
would have thought about had I not spent such an extended time in the community. Just a few 
examples could be the water or electricity disappearing for hours or days at the time, having 
to wade through sewage water close to 50 cm deep when it rained, not being able to find 
public transportation at night or a place to throw away my garbage during the day, and 
climbing up and down the endless, slippery steps of the steep internal pathways carrying 
heavy grocery bags in the blistering heat of the carioca
5
 summer. As one-time incidents these 
might seem like small issues, but they shape and form the reality for the residents that have to 
put up with the poor quality of the public services day after day. I also got to know the 
rewards of living there, such as the close-knit community bonds, being on first-name basis 
with the guy in the fresh produce stall, the laid-back atmosphere surrounding a Sunday pagote 
party, the simple joys of cold beer, barbecued picanha meat and good conversation, and the 
incredible openness and generosity of the residents.  
Observational evidence is often useful in providing additional information about the topic 
being studied (Yin 2009: 110). By being present over an extended period of time I could 
observe, among other things, how different the presence of the police and other public agents 
was in the favela compared to other neighborhoods of the city and how this affected people in 
their everyday lives. I also observed how the much talked about governmental interventions, 
such as the Niemeyer Bridge, the health clinic and the sport complex,
6
 worked in practice, 
which did not always correspond to the official story. This gave me valuable insights into the 
interrelationships between the state and the inhabitants.  
When I conversed with people in informal settings, such as on the street, in bars/restaurants, 
at parties or informal dinners in people’s homes, I would take mental notes which I would 
write down in my field diary when I returned home each night. To keep the interaction as 
natural as possible I would mainly take notes at the end of the day and not in front of the 
informants as I was worried a notebook would make people uneasy (Grønmo1996: 84). I 
however always carried a small notebook so I could write down a particularly important 
quote, number or likewise.  
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 Slang for Rio de Janeiro. 
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The major problems related to participant-observation according to Yin (2009) have to do 
with the potential biases produced. The researcher might get too involved in the participant 
role compared to the observer role, the researcher might “go native” and become a supporter 
of the group or organization being studied, or he or she might have to assume positions or 
advocacy roles contrary to the interests of good social science practice (Yin 2009: 112). It is 
easy to get sympathy for the informants and I found myself being emotionally involved in the 
stories and lives of especially my main informant, who included me in her family activities 
and was a big assistance in suggesting people for me to talk to. On a couple of occasions I left 
the community for weekend-trips outside of Rio de Janeiro which I felt was useful to clear my 
head and get some distance. I also focused on not relying too much on the contacts I got 
through the network of my key informant; I wanted to talk to other people whose opinions 
might be different from those in her social circuit. Another issue is related to the role I played 
within the community. I had several international friends who were journalists and 
photographers, of which two of them at one point were making a reportage on the pacification 
of Rocinha. If I was together with them in the community, the residents would not distinguish 
our projects from one another. On a couple of occasions this placed me in uncomfortable 
situations when they would ask residents questions that I was not comfortable with. To 
distance myself I tried to avoid mixing contacts and did not work with them. 
The aspiration was to evaluate what is currently going on in the community taking into 
account the existent social, cultural, economic and political structures, in order to understand 
the impact and thus the positive and negative consequences of the pacification and the 
governmental interventions. I have focused on talking to local actors rather than state agents. 
There is an abundance of public documents, news articles, books etcetera that quotes the 
“brains” of the project and display the official arguments. What lacks in the public debate is 
the voice of the residents, the ones that have to live with the consequences of this major 
intervention every day. I therefore wanted to first and foremost listen to their voice, which is 
often drowned in the narrative of the so-called experts.  
Interviews 
In addition to the informal interaction with residents throughout my stay, I wanted to conduct 
some interviews with certain key actors in the community; such as local leader figures, 
NGOs, the Residents’ Associations and the UPP police. These interviews were conducted to 
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see how people and organizations who work directly with the community view the impacts of 
the pacification and the ongoing processes. According to Yin (2009: 106) interviews are one 
of the most important sources of case study information. Both Thagaard (2009) and Valentine 
(2005) state that the goal of qualitative interviews is to get the informant to tell their version about 
events; how they view the world and the values they subscribe it.  
Interviews in qualitative research can take various forms; from surveys to in-depth interviews 
to focused interviews, depending on the type of information the researcher is looking for. An 
in-depth interview is according to Yin (2009: 107) an interview where the researcher asks key 
respondents about the facts of a matter as well as their opinions about events. The interviews I 
conducted were in-depth interviews in accordance with Yin’s classification. They were of an 
informal nature where I had prepared some topics and questions beforehand, but not a 
questionnaire. Different people were interesting because they could enlighten different topics 
and perspectives, and as such I did not feel there was a need for a standardization of the 
questions as the goal of the interviews never was to quantify the material gathered. Thagaard 
(2009: 89) describes informal interviews as a conversation between the researcher and the 
informant. The main topics are decided beforehand, but the informant can address new topics 
during the interview, and the researcher can adapt the questions to the information that comes 
up during the conversation. An advantage with this type of interview is that the researcher has 
the flexibility to adjust the direction of the conversation, and topics that the researcher might 
not have thought about can surge. I was also able to adjust the questions in accordance with 
information I had received in former interviews.  
I performed a total of 16 interviews, involving 18 people. Qualitative interviews often focus 
on an individual person. Group interviews are another method, where several people discuss a 
topic and the researcher plays the part as the moderator, leading the direction of the discussion 
(Thagaard 2009: 90). The majority of my interviews were interviews of a single individual, 
based on the idea that it is easier to create a safe environment and build trust with the 
informant with just the two of us present. However, I did end up conducting three group 
interviews of two people. In these cases I had intended to talk to both of the informants, and 
they happened to be at the same place at the same time and suggested we would do it 
together. Two of these interviews worked well. The first group interview I conducted was 
however not so successful, as I had wanted to talk to the informants because of different 
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reasons and was not able to get the information I had wanted from one of them.
7
 I therefore 
did a follow-up interview with her.  
For some of these interviews I brought a tape recorder to tape and later transcribe the 
interviews. Thagaard (2009: 102) states that the advantage of taping interviews is that it gives 
the researcher flexibility to concentrate on the informant and how he or she reacts to the 
questions and the setting. A lot of information aside from the conversation in itself surges in 
an interview setting. In the cases where I was able to use the tape recorder I found it beneficial 
and useful, as I could concentrate on the informant and the surrounding setting when I was 
not bound to taking detailed notes. However, many of my interviews were not taped. Two 
people were uneasy about the idea of being recorded so I respected their wish to not tape the 
interview without pushing it.
8
 On other occasions I found that recording was impractical or 
impossible due to the setting of the interview in a location with a lot of background noise, 
which I had not been able to predict and avoid. In these situations I took thorough notes which 
I wrote down as soon as I returned home, along with other observations and personal 
reflections around the interview (as I did with all the interviews). I do not feel like the essence 
of the interviews got lost by not tape recording them as my notes were thorough enough to 
reconstruct the conversation. In the appendix I have a list over the interviews performed as 
well as the other actors I have quoted, where I specify whether the interview was tape 
recorded or not.  
Seminars 
In addition to the data gathered in the community of Rocinha, I also participated in some 
events outside of the community itself. Two seminars were particularly fruitful in terms of 
meeting other researchers, activists and residents working with the pacification. The first one; 
Favela é Cidade! As UPPs, a proposta de Pacificação e a População do Rio de Janeiro (The 
favela is the city! The UPPs, the pacification proposal and the population of Rio de Janeiro) 
was arranged by the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) in Santa Martha on November 16
th
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 Group interview with João and Juliana November 5
th
 2012; a local politician and an NGO leader working with 
health issues. 
8
 One was the President of a Residents’ Association, who was uncomfortable about being interviewed in the 
first place because of the focus on the bonds between the Residents’ Associations and drug traffickers, which I 
will come back to. The other one was a former drug trafficker, who also felt uncomfortable about being 







 The second one; Unidades de Policia Pacificadora: Debates e Reflexões (Police 
Pacification Units: Debates and Reflections) was arranged by ISER (the Institute for the 






 Both of these institutes have been active 
in producing research on the pacification process. 
1.3.2 Process of Analysis 
“What we call our data is our own construction of other people’s construction of what they 
do” (Geertz 1973: 9). “The researcher has to reconstruct people’s construction of what they do 
and why and later interpret this through synthesizing their explanations and actions” (Ragin 
and Amoroso 2010: 58).  
In research, there are two broad methods of reasoning that are referred to as deductive and 
inductive approaches. Where deductive reasoning works from the more general to the more 
specific, inductive reasoning works the other way; moving from specific observations to 
broader generalizations and theories. While these two methods are usually regarded as 
exclusive, there are other alternatives. According to Alvesson and Skjöldberg (2009: 4) 
abduction is the method most commonly used in case based research processes. Abduction 
highlights the dialectical relationship between theory and data. More than a mix between 
inductive and deductive approaches, it adds new, specific elements. In its focus on underlying 
patterns, it differs from the two former models in that it includes understanding as well. In the 
abductive approach, the analysis of the data plays a key role when it comes to developing 
ideas, while the theoretical framework of the researcher provides perspectives on how the data 
can be understood (Thagaard 2009: 194). The process of analysis in abductive studies is 
characterized by an alternation between the study of previous theory and empirical data, and 
both are continually reinterpreted and adjusted in the light of each other (Alvesson and 
Sköldberg 2009: 4). My process of analysis has been characterized by abduction. It is not 
separate from the time spent collecting data; rather, it started during the fieldwork and has 
been a continuous process. With this approach to the process of analysis, it follows that the 
analytical framework (which will be presented in the following section) has continuously 
evolved throughout my time working on this thesis as part of the analytical process. Initial 
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theoretical propositions were challenged by rival hypotheses, or contrasted from the data I 
found in the field (Yin 2009: 124). This inspired further research on other theories, and 
created new categories of analysis. I am thus not testing opposing hypothesis in this thesis, 
but presenting the analytical framework that in my opinion corresponds most accurately to the 
data I found in the field.  
1.3.3 Ethical dilemmas  
Kvale (1996: 237) states that the validity of a research project depends on whether the study is 
conducted in an ethically responsible manner. Thagaard (2009: 25) emphasizes informed 
consent, confidentiality and lack of negative effects on the people subject to the research as 
basic ethic principals for social research.  
Informed consent means that the research project is only initiated after one has obtained the 
participants' free and informed consent. That consent is free, means it was issued without 
external pressure. Being informed means that the informant knows what the project is about, 
what it will be used for, and what they say yes to by participating in the project (Thagaard 
2009: 26). When talking to people in the field, I would explain that I was doing a research on 
the impact of the governmental interventions on the community. Any time I would talk with 
people about something relevant for my research either in an interview or in informal 
conversations that I would later write down, I would make sure they knew that the 
information would be confidential. Confidentiality means that those participating in the 
research project are entitled to trusting that all information they provide will be treated 
confidentially (Thagaard 2009). People were surprisingly open and willing to share even quite 
sensitive information about topics such as corruption, bonds with drug traffickers, their own 
involvement in illicit activities, etcetera. With the history of police-resident relations in the 
favelas of Rio de Janeiro you do not have to go many years back in time to where talking 
about these topics with an outsider could have led to serious consequences from either the 
drug traffickers or corrupt policemen if it became known. I therefore wanted to make it clear 
to people that the information would be confidential. This means that the research material 
has been made anonymous. As a researcher, I had to be careful about how I stored my 
material to make sure sensitive data could not be related to individuals in case of a robbery, 
for example. In this research, I have coded the informants according to their position 
(resident, undefined NGO leader, etcetera). However, some of the informants were public 
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figures where it would not be difficult for people interested to find out who it is (such as the 
current presidents of the AMs). I considered further anonymizing them, but as I do not 
provide any sensitive information that is not already public, and they had agreed to me using 
the interviews for this thesis, I kept it at that.  
The issue of confidentiality leads to the question on whether the research project will have 
negative consequences for those who choose to participate in it. Thagaard (2009: 29) says that 
ideally there should be reciprocity between what researchers’ gain of information and what 
informants get for being a part of the survey. In practice, however, that is hard to accomplish. 
I am privileged in being able to travel abroad and conduct research for a master thesis, and I 
therefore worried it would easily become an asymmetrical relation between me as a researcher 
and the informants as “objects” (Ragin and Amoroso 2011: 105). Ragin and Amoroso (2011: 
46) claims that the fact that the researcher places him or herself in their situation can be 
valuable in itself in the sense that the residents feel they have a voice that is worth listening 
to. However, I am without a doubt the party that has gained the most from these interactions. 
The most important aspect of this point I however see to be regarding the possible negative 
consequences for participants in the research project. To minimize such risks I have focused 
on the anonymity of the participants, not revealing sensitive information that can be traced 
back to an individual, and assuring people knew and agreed that what they told me would be 
used in this research.  
1.3.4 Validity and reliability 
Validity can be understood as the legitimacy of the research and interpretations of the 
researcher, or to what extent the interpretation in a good way represents the social phenomena 
to which it refers taking into consideration the researcher's own background and theoretical 
framework (Hammersley 1990: 57). To establish the quality of any empirical social research, 
there are several things that should be accomplished. There are different types of validity 
within qualitative research, regarding how the researcher presents and uses the evidence 
gathered and make a clear logical approach to the process of analysis.  
The analysis is based on the material gathered during my fieldwork, which focuses on the 
case of Rocinha and the residents of Rocinha’s perceptions of the pacification. However, I 
also use secondary sources and material gathered in other parts of the city with the intent of 
placing Rocinha in a conversation with the ongoing processes in Rio de Janeiro in general. It 
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is however not given that my findings or my case has transferability; one cannot assume that 
the empirical evidence I have found automatically corresponds to the perceptions of all of the 
residents in Rocinha or to these processes in other pacified favelas. While the favela residents 
are often imagined as a specific type of person; the favelado with the social (and racialized) 
connotations that implies, few elaborate on the diversity within the community. According to 
the residents themselves Rocinha has an estimated population of up to 200,000 people of all 
ages, educational backgrounds and socio-economic positions. I have not been systematic in 
my selection of residents to talk to, so I cannot claim the views and perspectives I have 
gathered to be statistically representative. People have different interests, experience different 
consequences, and demonstrate different attitudes to the pacification depending on the 
context. Through presenting my data and clarifying the way it has been gathered I however 
believe this thesis to be a good contribution to understanding the ongoing processes in 
Rocinha, which again serves as a contribution to understanding the processes in Rio de 
Janeiro in general.  
In the process of gathering information there is always a risk of biased information; especially 
from primary sources. Informants might have a “second agenda” in what they want to portray. 
It will inevitably be in the interest of the UPP police, for example, to focus on the positive 
things they are contributing with in the community, while a resident that has been a victim of 
police abuse might portray a solely negative image of the police. Due to inevitable biases it is 
important that the information collected is cross-checked from various sectors and sources 
within the community. I have tried to always take into consideration what position my 
informants are talking from, and when I quote from the interviews I make it a point to 
comment on the context where I feel this is necessary to clarify the background for the 
statement.  
This section has explained my methodological approach to the collection of data and the 
analysis of the material. The next section will focus on the theoretical framework that forms 
the foundation of my analysis.  
1.4 Theoretical Framework 
The pacification project is a public security initiative in the city of Rio de Janeiro, conducted 
by the state military police within the national border of Brazil. Yet, I think it is fruitful to see 
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this project in connection with a broader international context of security issues in relation to 
neoliberal urban management which has been decisive for the creation of the pacification 
program and the shape it has taken. This section will start by introducing the ongoing process 
preparing Rio de Janeiro for the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic games in 2016. Then, it 
will move on to a discussion around what kind of security regime is being implemented in the 
favelas with the pacification. Finally, it will introduce a discussion on citizenship and 
participation. This will serve as my interpretive framework throughout the rest of the thesis to 
evaluate the interrelationship between security and inclusive citizenship produced by the 
pacification program.  
1.4.1  Neoliberal governance and urban management 
According to Harvey (2005) and Hackworth (2007), political and economic practices and 
thinking since the 1970’s have been characterized by a decisive turn towards neoliberalism. 
Building on classic liberal values, neoliberalism proposes that human well-being can best be 
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade 
(Harvey 2005, ii). This framework, we will see, impacts the way security and urban 
development is conceptualized and therefore shapes the pacification project both when it 
comes to its ideological background, its execution and its consequences.  
With the turn towards neoliberalism that has characterized world politics and economy since 
the 1970’s, urban areas are increasingly becoming attractive places in which to invest. The 
neoliberal reform agenda is based on public sector restructuring in accordance with the 
standards of the new public management, private sector participation and processes of 
decentralization (Zérah 2009). This has had a profound impact on urban politics. Neoliberal 
governance is a form of city governance that seeks a flexible, market friendly and market 
oriented planning. The common interest of earlier modern planning has had to yield to a 
postmodern world of multiple interests where reason and general standards give way to 
compromises and case by case negotiations (Vainer 2011: 4-5). Business and business 
opportunities are essential foundations for the new city and the new urban planning that 
corresponds to the fluxions of the market. Different authors have termed this new strategic 
planning either ad hoc urbanism (Ascher 2001) urban entrepreneurism (Harvey 2005) or 
cidade empresa (Vainer 2011).  
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The neoliberal ideology reflected in the mode of city governance and as a driver of urban 
change in Rio de Janeiro today is part of the processes of liberalization, globalization and 
flexible modes of production that are currently occurring on a global scale. With Brazil’s 
booming economy, the finding of mayor new oil reserves, and the upcoming sporting events 
of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games, Rio is at the center of the world’s 
attention. More than a mere tourist attraction, these events will provide Rio with a valuable 
opportunity to place itself on the world map as a major political and economic actor. The 
“marvelous city”11 is reinventing itself in its quest to attract tourists, investments and capital, 
and a major urban renewal initiative has been launched to prepare the city for what’s to come. 
This process is radically transforming the urban space as well as creating new patterns of 
governance.  
According to Mascharenhas (2012: 96), Rio de Janeiro has two antagonistic models of urban 
management. On the one hand, you have the Master Plan inspired by the 1988 Constitution, 
which was widely debated and implemented in 1992. This Master Plan is based on a 
prioritization of public over private interests, and contains guidelines when it comes to a 
democratization of access to land, infrastructure, urban services and a democratic 
management of the city. It incorporates the framework of the Right to the City, a concept first 
introduced by Henri Lefebvre in his book Le Droit à la ville (1968). It can shortly be 
summarized as the right to dispute the appropriation of urban space by those who would 
subject it to the logic of the market, while defending the needs and desires of the majority and 
reaffirming the city as a site for social conflict (Lago 2012). On the other hand, you have the 
Strategic Plan of Rio de Janeiro which was elaborated in 1993 and 1994 and approved the 
year after by the municipality, private companies and business associations, without 
democratic channels of participation (Vainer 2000: 106). This powerful coalition would mark 
the start of a gradual transition towards a regime of flexible accumulation in the city of Rio de 
Janeiro.  
In business, efficient management relies on the ability to take advantage of opportunities 
faster than the competitors. In the view of strategic planning, the city itself should function as 
a company. Political control and bureaucracy, such as responding to the institutional rights 
and guidelines of the Constitution or the Master Plan, erodes a city’s capacity to take 
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 A cidade maravilhosa- the city of Rio de Janeiro became famous as the “marvelous city” in the end of the 19
th
 
century. See section 2.1. 
18 
 
advantage of business opportunities, and, consequently, come across as efficient and 
competitive (Vainer 2011: 5). To put into action a model of strategic planning therefore 
means overriding this legal framework, implying the denial of the city as a political space 
(Mascharenhas 2012: 96). This process of de-politicization has to be legitimized. This is 
where the project of turning Rio into an Olympic city comes in.  
1.4.2 Mega-events and a state of exception 
According to Vainer (2000), the overriding of institutional guidelines and implementation of a 
neoliberal regime can only happen by unifying the city around a common project. In Rio, the 
Olympic Games have served as the pretext, and two elements have been instrumental in this 
process; the generalized sense of an urban crisis, and the patriotism of the city (Vainer 2000: 
92). The city’s patriotism led to a profound sense of pride among the inhabitants at the 
prospect of hosting a global mega-event. Becoming an Olympic city has been the obsession of 
the carioca government, led by former mayor Cesar Maia (1993-1996 and 2000-2008). The 
city first applied to host the 2004 games, and won the 2016 games. The sense of crisis, on the 
other hand, stems from the escalating violence associated with the war on crime that has 
characterized the city since the 1990’s. In situations of crisis or war, exceptional actions are 
justified by the exceptional circumstances, leading to the acceptance of measures outside the 
legal framework. This permits the physical elimination of not only political opponents, but 
also of entire categories of citizens that are perceived as external and non-integral with society 
(Foucault 2003; Agamben 2005). Police abuse of civil and human rights in the favela has 
therefore been legitimized by the situation of “war” the city was perceived to be in.12  
In Rio, the urban crisis authorized and demanded a new form of power constitution in the city. 
The prospect of the benefits of the interventions that would come with turning Rio into an 
Olympic city facilitated stepping outside the institutional framework when necessary. 
Looking at the recent evolution of the legislation and urban practices in Rio, it is not hard to 
find examples of flexibilization in accordance with neoliberal governance. The City Statute 
from 2001, for example, opens up for so-called PPPs (public private parcels/consortiums) to 
go outside the current legislation of municipal law and the Master Plan when it comes to the 
use and occupation of the soil, changes in standards for construction and the regularization of 
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 See section 2.1.2 
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constructions, renovations or extensions (Article 32 paragraph 1 and 2, in Vainer 2011). The 
practice of legal exception has thus been authorized, consolidated and legalized.  
A new model of post-modern planning based on flexibility and competitiveness has redefined 
the ways dominant interests make themselves present in the city. The forms of illegality and 
exceptions to the institutional order are multiplying with the new emergency of the city: the 
mega-events. In order to prepare the city for the World Cup and the Olympics basic 
democratic rights are put on hold and the municipality is governed in accordance with the 
principles of the market. In the process of political and urban reform that has accompanied the 
construction of Rio as an Olympic city, Rio has been turned into a space for business, and no 
longer a space for political and democratic debate. The permanent sense of emergency has 
made Rio today a “city of exception” (Mascarenhas 2012; Vainer 2011), based on the theories 
of Agamben (2005) Poulantzas (1977, 1986) and Vainer (2000, 2011) about the state of 
exception. According to urban planner Raquel Rolnik; “the mega-events legitimize the “city 
of exception”. The “benefits” and “legacy” the constructors promote are imposed at the 
expense of poor communities and slums that are located near the sports facilities and the main 
access roads” (Carta Capital 2010). These changes in the urban management of Rio have been 
instrumental in bringing forth the pacification program.  
1.4.3 Securing neoliberal development 
According to Samara (2010, 2011), urban governance in a neoliberal environment is often 
driven by security concerns over protecting public order and economic growth, especially in 
highly unequal cities (such as Rio de Janeiro). As with Cape Town in front of the 2010 World 
Cup (see Samara 2010: 560), Rio de Janeiro’s quest to position itself on the global stage has 
resulted in two conflicting agendas. On the one hand, the desire to reach global city status in 
terms of attracting international investment, economic growth and tourism in order to 
demonstrate (Western) goals of urban achievement (Robinson 2002) demanded that the city 
would deal with the notorious insecurity that has given the city a reputation for being a 
dangerous place to visit. In order to secure the peace in the city as a whole, improving Rio’s 
reputation and thereby securing investments, the pacification program is reclaiming monopoly 
of power over strategically located favelas that have “threatened” the sense of security in the 
city. On the other hand, the reputation of Rio de Janeiro as one of the world’s most unequal 
cities demanded the need to implement pro-poor strategies to address the legacy of social and 
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spatial inequalities. The pacification therefore does more than just reclaim monopoly of 
violence; it also brings “developmental” measures to the pacified favelas. Through the federal 
PAC (Program for Accelerated Growth) program, pacified favelas like Rocinha are receiving 
investments in infrastructure and urban upgrading. The UPPs depend on PAC for their 
budget, which also is the principal fund for infrastructure associated with the World Cup and 
Olympics. This underlines the linkage between the pacification and the mega-events.  
The main investments in Rocinha through the PAC program have been big, spectacular 
projects such as a major sport complex and a bridge by the famous architect Oscar 
Niemeyer,
13
 striking symbols on how the government is spending an historic amount on 
previously neglected territories. Entering Rocinha today, you are welcomed by these 
landmark constructions and the brightly painted façades of newly renovated houses.
14
 The 
government claims that these interventions will promote a more equal access to services in the 
pacified favelas. The community without a doubt needs urban upgrading projects. The 
question is, however, how to interpret these developmental interventions and the inclusion 
they allegedly promote.  
According to Li (1999: 295), concerns with welfare and improvement fall under the rubric of 
"development" and provides many governing regimes with a significant part of their claim to 
legitimacy. The rationale for "development" as an activity of nation-states draws on the more 
general logic of governmentality, defined by Foucault (1991) as the “art and activity of rule”. 
Within a Foucauldian understanding of governmentality, development can therefore be 
understood as a project of rule. Joseph and Nugent (1994) argue that “development” in its 
national dimensions can be considered one of the more significant "everyday forms of state 
formation", which, like for example education and public administration, offer an arena in 
which the state can reaffirm its raison d'etre. Development authorizes state agencies to 
engage directly and openly in projects aimed at transformation and "improvement" of the 
communities, and through asserting a separation between the state (which does the 
developing) and the population (which is the object and recipient of development) these 
developmental interventions stand out as politically charged arenas in which relations of rule 
are reworked and reassessed (Li 1999: 297). Within a framework of neoliberal urban 
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 See appendix 4 and 5 for pictures of the entrance of Rocinha before and after the PAC projects. The brightly 
painted façades of the houses were renovated with resources from PAC, they however only painted the side 
facing the highway and the houses didn’t receive any other improvements.  
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governance currently going on in the city, the PAC projects can be interpreted as a 
demonstration of power; the state reclaiming and “colonizing” these territories as part of a 
neoliberal “development” process in the city. They are powerful symbols of how Brazil under 
PT has formulated a social democratic approach that combines economic concerns for growth 
with social concerns for the poor. They are also a daily reminder to the residents that the state 
has entered and is now governing these spaces.  
1.4.4 Biopolitics and the management of “the other” 
In addressing concerns about how security and development policy areas are increasingly 
interconnected with the (neo) liberal turn the last decades, scholars have picked up on Michel 
Foucault’s ideas of biopolitics and governmentality. A series of lections he held at the Collège 
de France in the 1970’s under the title “Society Must Be Defended” have recently been 
translated to English (Foucault 2003, 2007, 2008). While Foucault himself did not write 
directly about development, biopolitics, liberalism and development have been interpreted as 
intimately connected.  
With the emergence of neoliberalism, life itself becomes an economic instance and, as such, 
passes to be managed so as to optimize it (Foucault 2003). Foucault’s concept of biopolitics is 
a regulatory power that seeks to control and administer life by intervening in the biological, 
social and economic processes that constitute a human population (Duffield 2007: 16). Rather 
than exercising power over the individualized bodies, it is a power that manipulates, 
stimulates and observes collective phenomena such as birth rates, mortality and duration and 
conditions of life (Duarte 2008: 3). Foucaults’ understanding of the biopolitical takes life as 
the principal referent object for security discourses and practices. In an era where power must 
be justified both rationally and politically, biopolitics represents an inversion of the sovereign 
power to kill; it is a power to generate life. Yet, while it is about the life and vitality of a 
population, this does not mean that it represents a decrease in violence compared to a 
sovereign power. Rather, securing the life of some implies and demands the destruction of the 
life of others. The paradox of biopower is that it at the same time is about fostering life and 
has the ability to disallow life “to the point of death” (Duffield 2007: 34). In this power game, 
there is a separation between those beneficial to civilization, that will live, and those who are 
deviant and weak, who will be left to die; either literally or metaphorically through processes 
of marginalization or exclusion. The political conflicts of present times no longer express the 
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antagonist opposition between two opposing parties according to the Schmittian opponents 
Friend-Enemy. The enemies are not just political opponents, but biological entities that by 
their mere existence threaten the survival of society. As such, the enemy can no longer just be 
defeated, but must be exterminated. The genocides, concentration camps and “fortress 
Europe” of the 20st century are examples of the violence of the biopower.  
Inspired by the works of Foucault, but also the reflections of Walter Benjamin, Hanna Arendt 
and Carl Smith, Giorgio Agamben has written about the state of exception. Agamben (1995) 
shows how the effects of the decisions made by the state (or whoever has the sovereign 
power) can lead to the exclusion of somebody from the political community and the 
protection provided by its laws and rights. This “bare” or “naked life” represents persons or 
groups of persons that others, with impunity, can treat without regard for their psychological 
and physical well-being. Throughout the history of favela-state relations, there has been a 
progression of discretionary and coercive measures over the "other" of the favela supposedly 
threatening the well-being of the social body. The public security policies in Rio de Janeiro in 
the 1990’s was characterized by a discourse of “war” against the criminal drug traffickers in 
the favelas, and the media and the police reproduced the slogan “a good criminal is a dead 
criminal” (Fridman 2008: 77). In their interventions in the favela the police did not 
distinguish between regular residents and the traffickers, often leaving many dead in the 
aftermath of their interventions.
15
 As such, the favela residents, through their perceived 
connection with crime, were treated as bare life free to be killed without it representing a 
homicide in accordance with Agamben’s theories.16  
The hard-hand police interventions had proved incapable of lowering the violence. They also 
lost legitimacy in a world increasingly preoccupied by civil and human rights and a Brazil 
governed by a center-left administration promoting pro-poor policies and fighting inequality. 
While less violent than earlier police interventions, the UPPs establish a permanent 
militarized regime in the pacified favelas that go beyond combating the drug traffickers. In 
order to neutralize the threat these territories and populations are seen to pose to the rest of the 
city, a biopolitical regulatory regimen is implemented that manages the life of all favela 
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 See sections 2.1.6 and 3.1.1. 
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 Agamben’s negative analysis of biopolitics is challenged by Robert Esposito, who in Bios (2008) elaborate on 
immunity as an affirmative biopolitics; based upon the politics of life (biopotenza) as opposed to a power over 
life (biopotere). I however find Agamben’s analysis of the relationship between biopolitics and the state of 
exception to be fruitful when looking at the pacification in light of historic relations between the favela and the 
asphalt and the continued construction of the favela residents as “the other” also with the Pacification.  
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residents. It is virtually always in the name of human rights or the preservation of life that 
interventions are legitimized and justified, reinforcing the biopolitical paradox that the 
maintenance of life requires the destruction of other life forms.  
The theory presented so far represents the framework I will use in chapter 2, 3 and 4 to look at 
the logic that has shaped the public security policies in the favelas historically and the logic 
that shapes the pacification process today. In its connection to the mega-events and neoliberal 
management, the pacification program is related to the state of exception and the treatment of 
the favela residents as bare life that shaped earlier public security policies in the favelas. The 
question is therefore whether the pacification represents a clean rupture with the favela-
asphalt dichotomy. This has implications for the official goal of the pacification of promoting 
“full exercise and development of citizenship” (Henriques and Ramos 2011: 243) in the 
favelas.  
1.4.5 Citizenship and participation 
The institutional framework of Brazil guarantees participatory governance, which Mitlin 
(2004: 4) defines as a governance that places a particular emphasis on the inclusion of the 
people, especially the poor. The stress on the notion of inclusion implies that the democratic 
credentials of urban governance and its articulation with representative democracy are at the 
core of understanding participatory governance (Zérah 2009: 856). However, in the process of 
making Rio de Janeiro an Olympic city, the institutional framework guaranteeing 
participatory governance is contested by a flexible model of urban management.
17
 The new 
plan is no longer guided by the right to the city and social participation principles; rather, the 
strategic plan is steered by business demands and interests with the goal to make the city more 
“attractive” in the international market (Braathen et al. 2013: 9). This has implications for 
whether the pacification program can promote a “full exercise of citizenship” as it states in its 
goals.  
The favela residents have had the liberal right to vote that is part of a modern democracy, yet, 
they to a large degree have lacked a hands-on relationship with the state on the ground. 
According to Heller and Evans (2010: 309-310) citizens are made not only at the national 
level through constitutions and elections, but also in their day-to-day engagements with the 
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local state. In spite of an institutional framework guaranteeing universal rights to all Brazilian 
citizens, the favela residents’ relationship to the state has been characterized by what Holston 
(2007) has termed “differentiated citizenship”. Holston (2007: 7) suggests that the 
simultaneous presence of universal inclusion and massive inequality in Brazil has been 
negotiated through a citizenship that is qualified by a range of socio-economic, political, 
racial and cultural markers. These markers constitute the means through which to include 
people in the polity while maintaining their exclusion from substantive rights. The most direct 
relationship the residents had with the state was with the police apparatus, which was an 
accomplice of the multiple abuses against the favela residents. A situation in which one can 
vote freely and have one’s vote counted fairly but cannot expect proper treatment from the 
police or the courts puts into serious question the component of democracy and severely 
curtails citizenship (O’Donnell 1993: 1361).  
The pacification program brings with it new spaces of citizen engagement. According to 
Barbosa (2012) a principal feature of the UPP as a community policing program is, or should 
be, the joint participation of the residents in the production of order and the management of 
safety in the local communities. The program’s success will ultimately depend not only on 
effective and sustained coordination between police and state/municipal governments but also 
on favela residents' perception of the legitimacy of the state (Jones and Rodgers 2011). To be 
a legitimate power it is essential that the state knows and understands what the residents 
themselves want from the pacification process and the interventions that come with it. As 
such, the pacification program relies on building and maintaining relationships with the favela 
residents.  
If the pacification is to bridge the gap between the favela-asphalt dichotomy, and not just 
represent another way of imposing territorial control in a long history of socio-spatial 
discriminatory public security initiatives, the challenge is developing and sustaining a more 
substantive and empowered citizen participation in the political process than what is normally 
found in liberal representative democracy alone (Gaventa 2006). Gaventa (Ibid.) advocates for 
what has been termed the “deepening democracy” approach, which grows out of a long 
tradition of participatory democracy. In this view, democracy is not only a set of rules, 
procedures and institutional design. Full democratic citizenship is attained not only through 
the exercise of political and civic rights, but also through social rights; to be gained through 
participatory processes (Gaventa in Cornwall and Coelho 2007: xii).  
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In evaluating whether the pacification process confronts favela residents’ unequal inclusion in 
the city, I will take as a starting point the spaces of dialogue and participation that are created 
with the pacification and the dynamics of participation within them. In assessing these spaces, 
I will use the distinction between invited spaces; which Cornwall (2002) defines as spaces 
where citizens are invited by external agents to participate, and invented spaces which are 
spaces where citizens innovate and create their own opportunities and terms of engagement 
(Miraftab 2004).  
1.4.6 Concluding remarks  
This section has introduced a theoretical framework to contextualize the pacification program 
both on an ideological level and in relation to the current transformations the city of Rio de 
Janeiro is undergoing. It also introduces a framework of citizen participation that goes beyond 
the right to vote and advocates participatory governance. While this is guaranteed by the 
Brazilian framework the favela residents have not had access to decision-making processes 
because they have not been seen as citizens on equal terms. Today, the strategic plan of 
neoliberal management further challenges the access to citizen participation; not just for the 
favela residents but for all of the citizens of Rio de Janeiro. Together, this section will serve 
as my framework for assessing the inclusiveness of the current urban management and the 
pacification program as a product of this throughout the rest of this thesis.  
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2 The Divided City 
According to the State Secretary of Security, José Mariano Beltrame (2010);  
“The pacification has one objective and it is very clear: to tear down the walls around 
the favelas that have been imposed by the force of arms. If you enter an area dominated by 
traffickers or the militia, you have to account for your coming and going (...). It is 
unacceptable that citizens have to be accountable to an armed person who is not a server of 
the state.”  
The main objective of the pacification in the words of the Secretary of Security is thus to 
regain territorial control through obtaining monopoly of violence. But what is the cement of 
these walls that have surrounded the favelas that Beltrame wants to tear down? Today’s 
pacification approach is not formatted in a vacuum; rather, it is formed by past approaches 
and experiences, as well as public opinion, federal policies, and other factors. It is impossible 
to understand the failures, successes, and challenges of public security approaches in the 
favelas of Rio de Janeiro without understanding the historical side of favela-state interactions. 
While the introduction chapter looked at the theoretical and ideological background of the 
pacification in a wider perspective of global tendencies when it comes to urban management 
and public security, this chapter will focus on the socio-spatial history of Rio de Janeiro and 
the public policies towards the informal settlements, before introducing the pacification 
Program.  
2.1 Socio-Spatial Historic Background 
2.1.1 The historic construction of the favela-asphalt dichotomy 
In the end of the 19th century Rio de Janeiro became known as the “marvelous city”, 
celebrated for the beauty of its nature, the friendliness of its people and the vitality of the 
popular culture. Parallel with the production of the image of the city a tropical paradise, 
however, the favelas sprung up as aberrations on the modern city. Unpaid veterans and other 
poor migrants unable to find affordable land innovated and built their homes steep on the 
hillsides that are so characteristic of Rio’s landscape.  
Though physically intertwined with the formal city, the favelas represented a world apart. 
Today considered an urban phenomenon, the favelas were initially seen as a rural world 
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within the city. The book Os sertões (Cunha 2001) about the battle of Canudos between the 
recently formed Republic and the “salvages” from the interior of Bahia was influential in the 
social and political thinking of the Brazilian elite at the time. The image of the sertões, or the 
people from the interior described in this book serves as an origin myth for the favela 
discourse. Former soldiers from the battle of Canudos settled in the Morro da Favella, today 
known as Morro da Providência, in the late 1800s. This was the first favela in the city and 
gave the favelas the name they go by today (Valladares 2005). The former duality between 
the interior and the urban costal landscape (sertão/litoral) was thus transformed to the duality 
of the city versus favela. As the recently formed Republic was undergoing a nation-building 
process led by the white elite of European heritage, the favela populations were objectified as 
a “moral stain” on the nation they were constructing. The favelas represented a threat to the 
social and moral order of society as a whole, and needed to be contained to ensure that their 
pathologies (and poor residents) did not spill into the rest of the city. Mayor Pereira Passos’ 
urban renovation and beautification plan from 1906 marked the first favelas for removal, with 
the object of sanitizing and civilizing the city (Valladares 2005: 24).  
Up until the 1930’s the growth of the favelas remained quite slow, but this decade marked the 
start of a process of “favelization”18 which would only intensify in the following decades. As 
a result of the structural transformations promoted by the progress of modern capitalism, rural 
migrants unable to find work in the countryside were pouring into the big cities. As there was 
a shortage of affordable housing, the majority ended up in self-constructed shacks in the 
favelas. No longer able to ignore their presence, the 1937 código de obras (code of 
construction) officially recognized the existence of favelas in the city and the need to improve 
the living conditions of the favela residents. It however stated that the formation of new 
favelas, or the construction of new houses or improvement of existing ones, was absolutely 
prohibited (Valladares 2005: 52).  
The 1940’s and 50’s represented a new era of political relations between the favela residents 
and the city. The favelas now constituted a big part of the population, and consequently, 
potential voters. Under Vargas, who was declared the “father of the poor”, it was no longer 
acceptable to intervene in the urban spaces considered problematic without considering the 
fate of their residents. The first proletarian parks were constructed, removing people from the 
favelas into new provisory neighborhoods. These parks were not just about housing but also 
                                                 
18
 Favelizaçáo; a process of proliferation of the favelas.  
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for the “civilization” and reeducation of the residents, correcting personal habits to incentivize 
the choice of better housing in the future (Burgos 1998: 28). As such, the racialized discourse 
of the white elite’s nation building process in the late 1800’s was still present in the 
government’s handling of the favelas, as the culture of the poor and mainly black residents 
continued to be seen as a problem. The proletarian parks were supposed to serve as transition 
housing; they however proved to be a massive failure. People never moved on, and in the 
census of 1950, only a few years after their construction, these parks were classified as favelas 
themselves (Valladares 2005: 69).  
The period of the military dictatorship again redefined the public policies towards the 
informal settlements. In the late 1960s and early 70s the vast majority of the favelas of Rio de 
Janeiro were targets of public removal policies. The federal government founded the 
Coordination Agency for Habitation in the Social Interest of the Greater Rio Metropolitan 
Area (CHISAM) in 1968. CHISAM defined the favelas as an “abnormal within the urban 
environment” and saw favela removal as an essential step towards integrating favela residents 
into society. In the first seven years of CHIS AMs existence, about 70 favelas were removed 
and 100,000 people were forcibly relocated. The residents were moved to new housing units 
in areas distant from the city center, such as Cidade de Deus, Vila Kennedy, Vila Aliança and 
Vila Esperança, all constructed with financial support from the US government (Oliveira 
2012: 45). This focus on removal and construction of new popular housing was only partially 
successful, as it addressed the issue as a mere problem of balancing the spatial distribution of 
the population without considering housing in the urban context (Andrade and Valverde 2003: 
57). Brazil went from being a mainly rural country to being 56 percent urbanized in 1970 and 
over 80 percent urbanized today (IBGE 2010). This massive urbanization process placed a 
major pressure on the housing market in the city, especially for affordable housing. The 
favelas therefore grew uncontrollably. 
With the political opening in the end of the 1970’s and the transition to democracy in the mid-
1980’s, state policies towards the informal settlements were revised again. As they had 
proved incapable of solving the housing deficit in the city, the removal policies were put to an 
end and the public debate shifted to concentrating on the necessity of integrating the favelas 
in the city (Oliveira 2012: 47). The legal framework of the new urban order was enshrined in 
the 1988 Constitution, which recognized the social right to housing and the right to 
regularization of consolidated informal settlements. The election of Leonel Brizola as 
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governor of the state of Rio on a platform that supported building relationships with favelas 
and the Residents’ Associations (Associações de Moradores or AMs) was also central. 
Recognizing the large potential voting base the favelas represented, Brizola initiated mayor 
urban upgrading programs in the favelas. These included Proface (1983-1985), which sought 
to bring basic sanitation, lighting and garbage collection to the favelas, Cada Família um 
Lote, a property regularization program distributing land titles, Mutirão, a project that used 
work force from local community in construction work, and finally the Favela-Bairro project, 
launched by the municipality in 1993, that proposed to upgrade all of the city’s favelas 
(Oliveira 2012: 47-49). 
2.1.2 1980’s and 90’s- the discourse of war consolidates 
While the 1980’s and Brizola meant a transition from extermination policies to urban 
upgrading of the favelas that did not mean that the tensions between the favelas and the rest of 
the city were easing up. The emergence of the drug trade in the 1970’s had made the favelas 
centers of drug trafficking, as the narrow pathways on unmapped, unpatrolled hillsides and 
weak state presence made them ideal for drug traffickers who could defend themselves 
against rivals and elude police capture. As both international and domestic demand for 
cocaine grew, traffickers and criminal groups were growing and competing for power with the 
Residents’ Associations inside the favelas. They had the financial resources to provide 
assistance to favela residents in a variety of ways, maintaining order and providing social 
assistance in areas where public services where limited at best. This led to the notion that 
gangs could provide for the community as well as, if not better than, the state and the AMs, 
weakening both the civil society in the favelas and the fragile state presence (Fridman 2008; 
Perlman 2010).  
While there had certainly been violence and crime in favelas earlier too, it had been on an 
extremely small scale compared to the escalating violence after the emergence of the drug 
trade. The violence associated with the drug trafficking grew in frequency and intensity 
throughout the late 1980’s and 90’s, and assaults, robberies, kidnappings, shoot-outs and 
balas perdidas (“lost bullets” striking innocents caught in a cross-fire) became everyday 
security issues. This reinforced the image of the favela as a threat to the civilized order of the 
formal city, now because of its connection to organized crime. The rhetoric of the perceived 
threat of the favela thus evolved from being focused on sanitary or hygienic issues, or the 
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threat of the “dangerous” popular classes, to the supposedly violent and criminal nature of the 
favela residents (Valladares 2005; Leite 2000, 2012; Machado da Silva 2008).  
2.1.3 The dichotomous relationship between the favela and the 
asphalt 
Since the beginning, the favelas have represented a radical otherness in relation to the rest of 
the city and society, in other words, as “other places” or heterotopias, in the sense proposed 
by Foucault in his lecture Of Other Spaces from 1967 (Foucault and Miskowiec 1986). The 
favela can be seen as a heterotopia in the Foucauldian sense; a space detached from the norm 
of the ordinary city. Contrary to the utopias, that have no real space, the heterotopia features 
an actual physical space, a space occupied by “the others”, those who deviate from the norm. 
According to Leite (2012) the favelas have been constituted in the social perception as “other 
places” because of a sociability perceived as averse to the dominant norms and values. This 
dichotomous relationship can also be seen in light of Charles Tilly (1998). In Durable 
Inequality (1998) Tilly claims that social inequalities are relational and rooted in power 
asymmetries. He argues that most forms of inequality are organized around binary or 
hierarchically bounded categories such as male/female, black/white, or, in the case of 
hierarchical inequalities, class and caste (Heller and Evans 2010: 307). The dichotomy 
between the favela and the asphalt throughout the history represents the kind of opposition 
pair that Tilly describes. While the content of the favela discourse has changed over the last 
century, its dichotomous relationship to the official city in the public imaginary has sustained. 
Tilly claims that durable inequalities persist because socially constructed categories do the 
work necessary to keep them in place (Tilly 1998). Dominant groups have an interest in 
reproducing their privileges and do so through an “economy of practices” (Bourdieu 1984) 
that enforce the boundaries of the privileged and ensure ongoing exclusion (Heller and Evans 
2010: 307). The construction of the favela/favelado discourse in the public imaginary is a 
continuous process, and while imagined in line with Anderson (1983) the categories do real 
work of exclusion. The almost systematic association between poverty and violent crime from 
the 1980’s and onwards made the favela synonymous with a space outside of the law, where 
criminals and police were constantly fighting. The city was seen as irremediably divided 
(Ventura 1994) and perceived to be in a state of war, which had important implications for 
citizenship and access to the city for the favela residents.  
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2.1.4 Urban violence- the discourse of the violent sociability of the 
favelados 
Different interpretations on the topics of citizenship and human rights were disputed in Rio de 
Janeiro in the 1990’s and the 2000’s by the security apparatus, the media, by successive 
governments and civil society organizations. The public policies towards the favelas 
fluctuated between two general categories; traditional “hard hand” security approaches that 
focused heavily on the role of the police and the BOPE elite squad, and more progressive 
policies that attempted to address not just symptoms but also the underlying causes of 
violence and insecurity (Leite 2000; Tierney 2012). 
Academia, NGOs and civil society organizations advocated for a public security policy under 
democratic control, and demanded respect for the human and civil rights of the populations 
affected by police violence (Leite 2000: 74-79). The hard hand perspective, on the other hand, 
tended to regard human rights as a mere bureaucratic framework that favored the criminals. 
The people living in the favelas were considered accomplices of the criminals because of 
neighborhood relations, kinship or economic and political ties (Leite 2012: 380). The favela 
was seen as a territory for non-citizens, subjected to a force rival to that of the state, the so-
called law of the traffickers. As follows, in the public imaginary, there were no innocents in 
the favelas. As exceptional circumstances (such as war) require exceptional measures outside 
the democratic and institutional normality, police violence and civil rights violations were to a 
certain degree justified as part of the game. 
According to Foucault (1979) crime and criminals are socially constructed. This in turn 
creates the category of “potential criminals” based on the potential of a subject to commit acts 
of crime because of earlier actions, social position, physical or moral aspects, the way they 
dress or other determinants. The view that one can foresee comportments based on 
psychological tests, criminal antecedents, or the location where people live or work give base 
to the conceptualization that some individuals or groups have inherent characteristics. In Rio 
de Janeiro, the social construction of the favela residents as “carriers of dangerousness” 
served as a justification for the police institution to intervene in the favelas to prevent crime 
and protect the city from the perceived threat of the “potential criminals” which the favela 
was seen to harvest and represent.  
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In an interview 24
th
 of October 2007, Governor Sérgio Cabral suggested that abortion, which 
is illegal in Brazil, could function as a form of violence control in the favelas. On why he was 
in favor of women’s right to end unwanted pregnancies, he stated that:  
“It has everything to do with violence. If you look at the number of children per 
mother in Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas, Tijuca, Méier and Copacabana (upper middle-class 
neighborhoods) it is a Swedish pattern. Then, look at Rocinha. It is the pattern of Zambia, 
Gambia. It is a factory producing marginals.”19  
The Governor bluntly stated that legalizing abortion to lower the number of children born in 
the favelas could serve as a measure to reduce violence and with that, purify the city. He thus 
directly contrasts the perceived threatening, violent sociability of the favelados to the citizens 
in formal neighborhoods who need to be protected from the former.  
2.1.5 State absence, state presence 
As we see, the favelas have always been constructed as a world apart. The nation-building 
process that started with the white elite looking towards Europe in the 1800’s has been a 
process of exclusion of those who do not fit the mold of the “imagined community” of the 
nation (Anderson 1983). Since the 1960’s, post-colonial writers have questioned the way the 
European nation-state has served as an explicit or implicit model for other countries, defining 
the categories through which the rest of the world is interpreted and understood. With this 
historic backdrop, Das and Poole (2004) called for a political anthropological exploration of 
the “margins of the state”, leaning on the work of Foucault. These “margins” are neither 
defined by geographic frontiers nor referring to areas where the state presence is fragile or 
non-existent, rather, the margins of the state are seen as territories or populations that are 
produced as marginal by the dynamic of the modern state (Machado da Silva and Leite 2008: 
53). Whether the favela is the “margins of the state” in a concrete manner, as in an area 
lacking state presence, or in a more postcolonial understanding, has been part of the debate on 
urban violence in Rio de Janeiro.  
According to Arias (2006: 3) there have been two divergent explanations of violence in the 
informal settlements of Rio; the divided city approach and the state accomplice approach. 
Both focus on the role of the state and the police in catalyzing and intensifying violence. The 
first asserts that the state has long been physically and symbolically absent, or at least distant, 
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 Freire (2007) 
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from the informal settlements where violence has been concentrated. The absence of the state 
left these spaces unprotected and permitted non-state armed actors to establish order. The 
criminals’ territorial control removed the zones of urban poverty from the state and created an 
archipelago of independent areas that the rule of law could not reach (Soares 2000: 269). The 
favelas were seen as violent territories and the populations that lived there as accomplices of 
the agents of violence; the traffickers. This view has its origins in the perceptions of the 
favelas as an “other”, as presented in the dominant public narrative of the “legal versus illegal 
city” and “the state within the state”. These myths have sustained a grand part of the 
interpretive package that has shaped the policies towards these territories and the horizons of 
the proposals and measures to control and reduce the problem of urban violence in Rio de 
Janeiro (Machado da Silva and Leite 2008: 49). However, while this view provides valuable 
insights into the way people, police and politicians in Rio have perceived the problem of 
violence and drug trafficking, it does not go far enough in examining how the deep 
interconnections among state officials and favela leaders have contributed to the urban 
violence (Arias 2006: 4).  
Urban violence is more than a simple synonym with common crime or with violence in 
general. Criminal conduct is often explained because of a low cost of opportunity, where 
disorganization in the administration of the justice system leads to “temptations” (Machado da 
Silva and Leite 2008: 39-44). This kind of explanation falls back on an understanding that 
there is a lack of laws and rules that is the problem and therefore the reason for urban 
violence. This is an overly simplified way of explaining the urban violence as we know it in 
Rio. As we’ve seen through the socio-spatial history of Rio, the escalating crime and violence 
in the city in general and in the favelas in particular cannot be interpreted as a mere 
consequence of a low cost of opportunity, but must be seen in relation to a centuries long 
history of marginalization and exclusion. Following that line, the second explanation of 
violence sees the state as very present in the informal settlements, but in different ways than 
in the formal city. This view claims that the state has been present in ways that actually 
deepen the violence. Although the relationship between the favela and the formal city has 
been socially conceptualized as a binary opposition in a Tillyan view, there has not been a 
water-proof barrier between the two in practice. Through threats of removal, urban upgrading 
projects, police interference and clientilistic political relations, the public power has been very 
much present in the lives of the favela inhabitants. The traffickers have been involved in 
networks that bring together civic leaders, politicians, police and the criminals, linking 
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trafficker dominated favelas with Rio’s broader political and social system (Arias 2006). 
According to Soares (2000), the drug dealers could never have maintained power if they did 
not have solid support within the state apparatus. The police institutions themselves also acted 
as instruments of repression.  
2.1.6 The military police institution 
The military police (polícia militar or PM) has its origins in the National Guard (Guardia 
Nacional) founded by Emperor Dom Pedro in 1831 which served as a private army for the 
royal family (Barman 1999: 37). The police was thus initially intended for the protection of 
the elite and the government, not the citizens, of Rio, and this legacy has continued to shape 
the institution. From its earliest days, the military police has been described as fighting a war, 
but unlike a war against an external enemy on the battlefield, the objective was not to 
exterminate or eliminate an adversary. Rather, the goal was repression and the maintenance of 
order, enabling the city to function in the interests of the class that made the rules and created 
the police to enforce them (Holloway 1993: 37).  
During the military regime (from 1964 to 1985) the PM was institutionally subsumed under 
the armed forces. Of the many institutional transformations with the democratic transition, the 
one institution that was not democratized was the security apparatus (Leeds 2007: 22). While 
legal norms were revised, norms of accountability were not. Laws of exception were issued to 
accommodate police oversteps or conceal them from outside scrutiny, and within the 
discourse of war, shifting legal boundaries blurred the tenuous distinctions between the legal 
use of force and illegal repression (Caldeira and Holston 1999: 700). Police violence actually 
peaked during the democratic era, when more civilians have been killed annually by the 
police than the total disappeared during the military dictatorship. 
The BOPE and the PM have never been trained to recognize the humanity of the favela 
residents. When the police climbed the hills of the favelas, it was with the mentality and 
tactics of an occupying army. They approached in tanks known as the caveirão, or the big 
skull, with machine guns pointing out from underneath armor-plated hoods. The symbol of 
the BOPE elite squad is a skull with a sward pointed downwards through it, on a black 
background with two crossed pistols. This symbol is quite emblematic for the attitude of the 
BOPE police. The skull symbolizes death, the sward signifies combat and its position through 
the skull indicates war. The black background represents mourning and the pistols the 
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emblem of the military police (Hinton 2009: 218).
20
 This is far from a protect- and serve-
mentality, at least towards the favela population seen as enemies because of their perceived 
connections with crime. Between 2003 and 2007, 5,669 people were killed by the police. 
Although almost all of the deaths were registered as acts of resistance, meaning as a 
consequence of the victim putting officers’ or others’ lives at risk, research done in 2003 
shows that 65% of those killings had unmistakable signs of execution (Soares 2009). When 
people are killed in confrontation with the police, the article 23 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedures states that the police agent, who is at the same time the perpetrator and the 
witness, shall make a statement of what happened that goes to the register of deaths. This not 
only concealed and justified executions, but also made it impossible in practice to file a 
prosecution, thus excluding the police from the law (Leite 2012: 381). The result was the 
impunity of the police agents.  
Notoriously corrupt, police officers have been known for taking bribes from traffickers in 
return for looking the other way. When deals went sour, the police would not shy away from 
using violence. In their repression of the traffickers, and in their collusion with them, the 
military police gave the criminals legitimacy by making the violence of the state almost 
indistinguishable from that of the traffickers (Tierney 2012: 25). While the discourse of war 
and the notion of the violent sociability of the favela residents shaped the public opinion and 
policies towards these territories, the state presence and the police themselves, as well as the 
degradation and illegitimacy of institutions, have been instrumental in escalating the armed 
conflict.  
2.2 From a Metaphor of War to a Discourse of Peace 
The hard-hand public security initiatives proved inefficient in combating the urban violence 
and the drug trafficking, much of it because the police institution itself was an accomplice. 
With the transformations in the city, state and federal governments since the turn of the 
century, Brazil’s position internationally as a center-left developmental state (Heller and 
Evans 2010) and an international focus on human and civil rights, the situation was becoming 
unbearable. The war on crime had produced an image of the city as irredeemably divided and 
dangerous and with no respect for the human rights of its inhabitants, which was becoming an 
“anti-postcard” for Rio de Janeiro (Ventura 1994).  
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In 2007, the Brazilian federal government created a national program for public security, 
called PRONASCI. The main objective of PRONASCI was to combat crime, violence and 
insecurity that were results of unstable conditions. PRONASCI introduced the concept of 
“citizen security” to Brazil, which represents a security policy directed more towards the 
citizens through practices focused on prevention rather than repression (Souza and Compans 
2010). The creation of PRONASCI resulted, among other things, in the state of Rio de Janeiro 
being given a greater autonomy in forming its security politics. The year 2007 therefore 
marked the start of a new era in security in Rio de Janeiro, and the initially federal measure of 
the PRONASCI was instrumental in leading up to the creation of the UPP program at state 
level in Rio de Janeiro. When Eduardo Paes was elected as the successor of Cesar Maia as 
mayor of Rio de Janeiro in January 2008, all three levels of government (municipal, state and 
federal level) were from allied political parties for the first time in nearly three decades. This 
alignment of forces and interests has translated into political and financial support for the UPP 
program from all levels of government. From 2006 to 2010 investments in public security 
were increased by 47% in Rio de Janeiro (Urani, Giambiagi and Souza 2011: 86).  
Before moving on to the practices of the UPP police, it is important to keep in mind that the 
pacification is far from becoming the generalized approach to policing in the favelas. By the 
time the UPP is slated for completion in 2016, only some 200 of Rio's 1,000 plus favelas will 
have been “pacified”, although the number of police personnel in the city is due to double 
from 32,000 to 64,000 (Teixeira 2011). The fact that the favelas that are to receive this 
program are the centrally located or symbolically loaded ones
21
 has led Mulli (2011), 
Machado da Silva (2010) and others to speculate whether it is merely a temporary effort to 
stall the violence and secure the city in front of the World Cup and the Olympics. Many of the 
favelas on the outskirts of the Rio are equally, if not more, violent than the ones being 
pacified. However, the violence there does not “spill” into middle-class neighborhoods in the 
same degree. In the rest of the city’s favelas it is still the metaphor of war that shapes the 
public security policies and the police activity. 
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 Such as Cidade de Deus, one of the resettlements formed in the 1960’s when the city was systematically 
removing favelas from the center. It is famous from the movie with the same name from 2002. 
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2.2.1 The pacification approach 
The pacification is a three step process that starts with the occupation of the territory by the 
PM and the BOPE elite squad. The date of the occupation is always announced beforehand, 
giving the drug traffickers time to leave the area to avoid confrontations. An announcement 
was made a week in advance of BOPE’s intervention in Rocinha in November 2011, and 
despite anticipation of resistance, no shots were fired. Once the initial territorial takeover has 
been carried out, the police forces identify and remove sources of resistance and criminal 
elements in a second phase focusing on stabilizing the area. During this phase, BOPE forces 
are stationed inside the favela around the clock. While this occupation is supposed to be a 
short transitioning period, in Rocinha it took 10 months from the time BOPE entered the 
favela until the UPP was officially inaugurated September 20
th
 2012. During this time, the 
police were charged with several offenses that made it difficult for the community to 
distinguish the new policing approach from the discriminatory police they know all too well 
from earlier interventions. A dossier produced by the coordination office of the Civil Police 
Intelligence revealed that police officers had been taking bribes of an initial 200,000 Reais 
followed by a monthly allowance of 80,000 Reais for not interfering with the drug trade in the 
internal alleys of Rocinha, restricting the patrolling to the main roads (Veja 2012). In 
addition, three police officers were charged with rape. According to the residents I spoke to 
this was an unstable period where the sense of security was worse than before the 
pacification.
22
 Gradually people however got used to the police presence and the situation 
stabilized. That is when the third phase of the occupation began, which is the 
community/proximity policing where UPP units are deployed on a permanent basis. 
While the average number of inhabitants per police officer in the state of Rio de Janeiro is 
405, in UPP communities that number is 101 (Urani et al. 2011: 91). 700 UPP officers patrol 
the streets of Rocinha 24/7, and the community has received 100 high definition surveillance 
cameras. If you rely on the official figures on the population count, it is the most heavily 
monitored area in the world (BBC News 2013). Through cameras and police officers present 
around the clock people are constantly monitored. Supporters claim that this high rate allows 
the UPP officers to engage in proximity policing, getting to know the community and the 
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inhabitants and developing a relationship of trust. Alternatively, you can see it as creating a 
police state, a big brother-society where everything you do is monitored.
23
  
Although portrayed as innovative, the pacification program is not a new idea, but based on 
past attempts at police reform. Colonel Nazareth Cerqueira, commander of the PM in Rio de 
Janeiro from 1983 to 1987 and from 1991 to 1994 as the first civilian policeman rather than 
and army officer to hold this position, was responsible for bringing the philosophy of 
community policing to Brazil. Contemplating the role of the military police in the democratic 
era, he sought an alternative to police repression because he saw that it was ineffective in 
reducing violence and incompatible with democracy (Tierney 2012: 31). Rio has had several 
earlier community policing programs; including the Posto de Policiamento Comunitário 
(Community Police Posts), Centro Integrado de Policiamento Comunitário (Integrated Center 
of Community Policing), Batalhão Comunitário (Community Battalion), and the more recent 
Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais (GPAE) (Police Grouping in Special Areas) 
(Melicio, Geraldini and Bicalho 2012: 607). In general these programs did not last long as 
they have lacked political support and financing, and the police were often far outnumbered 
by drug traffickers. Compared to these earlier proximity policing attempts, that all proved to 
be failures, the UPPs have received wide support and backing from the media, business, 
politicians and society in general.  
Rodrigues and Siqueira (2012) problematize the policing model of the UPP and the lack of 
clear definitions and goals of the program. They claim that the UPPs are not a program or 
model of neither policing nor public security; rather, they represent an assembly of policing 
experiences. In treating the UPP as a model of policing, the official discourse sells the 
pacification as something that is going to “save” the favela populations. The UPPs are 
however far from a consolidated practice, and Rodrigues and Siqueira (2012: 13) claim that 
promoting the UPP as such reveals the farce of this experiment which in many ways has 
become a program of major prestige for Governor Sérgio Cabral and Mayor Eduardo Paes to 
prepare the city for the Rio +20 conference, the World Cup and the Olympics.  
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2.2.2 More routine, less exception 
For all the questionable aspects of the pacification; from the selection of favelas for 
pacification to the lack of clear definitions and goals of the program to the actions of the UPP 
police, the pacification can still have positive effects in the local setting. And while we can, 
and will, criticize the problematic sides of the pacification program there are some obvious 
improvements that come with the it that deserve to be mentioned, such as the changes in 
police action.  
The pacification produces some effects in the daily lives of the residents that are almost 
immediate, the permanent presence of the police and the cease of fire being the most dramatic 
ones. Rodrigues and Siqueira (2012: 15) see the cease of fire as as much of an everyday life 
question as a political question. The cease of fire refers both to the fact that the pacification 
puts a halt to the vicious circle of police interference in the favelas that dramatically shaped 
the lives of the residents there, and that it represents a change in the public security policy 
towards these territories. No longer seeking confrontation but avoiding it, evident from the 
beginning of the occupation where they announce the date in advance in order to avoid a 
shoot-out, the pacification police is certainly a relief from police business as usual in Rio. 
This leads to an instant reduction in the fear of a violent death, not mainly because of the exit 
of the traffickers, but because of the changes in the police institution within the favela.  
As such, while pacifying the informal settlements the pacification process is also pacifying 
the military police institution. The UPP police receive training in sociology and human rights 
in order to break with the historic framing of the favelados as criminals and non-citizens. 
Looking at the statistics, it can seem as if it has given results. In 2007, the deadliest year on 
record, 1,330 people in the state and 867 in the city of Rio de Janeiro were killed by the PM 
as an act of resistance. In 2012, however, the correspondent numbers had dropped to 415/283 
people (Instituto de Segurança Publica). Although still high on a per capita basis, this 
represents a dramatic decline for a five year period. As the statistics from Soares (2009) 
reported that a high level of deaths at the hands of the police have had unmistakable signs of 
execution, the issue of corruption that has characterized the PM institution is another concern 
the pacification is trying to address. In an attempt to prevent corruption among UPP officers, 
the program only recruits officers straight from the academy (except for the captain and some 
administrative posts) (Melicio, Geraldini and Bicalho 2012: 607). Beltrame argues that if 
officers have been on the job outside UPP bases hey might have been “spoiled” as they are 
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likely to have learned how to take bribes and other bad practices (Damasceno 2011). Ensuring 
that UPP officers are held accountable for their actions is crucial to building legitimacy with 
favela residents. While it is naïve to think that the UPPs are incorruptible the UPP approach 
might help reduce this problem. As UPP officers are stationed in the communities on a long-
term basis, building personal relationships with the residents, this might facilitate the 
possibilities of allegations of abuse of authority (Melicio et.al 2012).  
2.2.3 Concluding remarks 
In his influential work Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes described the hypothetical “natural 
condition of men living together without a common power to keep them in awe as a “state of 
nature” or a “state of war” (Doyle 1997: 114). To avoid the terror of a state of natural war 
people create a social pact, rendering some rights for the sake of protection from the 
Leviathan, the sovereign authority. In the context of war in Rio, the favelados were perceived 
as barbarians invading the city, breaking the social contract. The demands for order and hard 
hand policies were therefore justified in order to uphold the civilized order in the city. As the 
state, through the UPP police, now is taking over the role as the Leviathan in the favelas, life 
gets more of a feeling of routine, and less of exception. A study released by the Laboratório 
de Análise de Violência found that the inauguration of UPPs has reduced the rates of violent 
deaths by up to 78 percent (Averbuck 2012). A big step forward with the pacification is thus 
that fear of death ceases to be people’s number one concern in pacified favelas (Rodrigues 
and Siqueira 2012: 16). This might be modest, and taken for granted other places, but the fear 
of death was a central aspect of everyday life before. Yet, following Hobbes, when the fear of 
death ceases to be the central aspect of collective life, the Leviathan soon ceases to be enough 
for the necessities and horizons of coexistence (Rodrigues and Siqueira 2012: 16). Security is 
about more than lack of fear of death. It is also about securing other civil and human rights 
that all Brazilians have a Constitutional right to; such as housing, health and participation.  
This chapter has addressed the historic construction of the favela as “the other”, the historic 
hard-hand police interventions that have been justified because of the perceived threats these 
territories constitute, and the agenda of the pacification that claims to break with this past. 
The next chapters will look at the localized outcomes of this policy when it comes to effects 
on security and citizenship for the residents. Are the pacified favelas included in the social 
pact of the rest of the city? 
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3 Enforcing Security  
The State Secretary of Security José Mariano Beltrame (2010) has stated that the main 
objective of the pacification is to break down the walls imposed by non-state armed forces 
surrounding these territories. The socio-spatial history of Rio de Janeiro however shows how 
the cement of the walls erected around the favelas goes beyond the armed force of illicit 
criminal groups. Rather, the wall to be torn down is as much of an ideological wall; the 
symbolical threat of the “other” to the well-being of the social body that has been constructed 
through centuries of racism, marginalization and exclusion. Since the favelas first emerged, 
the public policies towards the informal settlements have been motivated by seeking to 
contain and control them, because of the constant fear that the favela would spill into the city 
(o morro descer) (Leite 2000: 77). The favelados have been seen as a “carriers” of 
dangerousness, justifying police action and violence in the favelas. Although the automatic 
connection between the favela and violent crime is biased, the reality is that violent crime and 
its victims have been highly localized in these territories. This provides the justification for 
the security intervention of the UPPs in the favelas. A headline of the pacification has been 
the decline in the number of homicides in pacified favelas, and the state government has also 
drawn attention to several opinion polls that show people “feel” safer after the 
implementation of the UPPs (see for example Globo 2012). The picture on the ground is 
however inevitably more complicated.  
This chapter will look at what kind of security regime is being implemented and whether it 
breaks with the construction of the favela as “the other” that has characterized favela-state 
relations.  
3.1.1 Violence and governance 
In the eyes of the governmental agents, the violence of the traffickers was seen as dangerous, 
destabilizing and threatening. Authorities allege that they are liberating the communities by 
freeing them from the traffickers’ rule, which, in the words of deputy commander of the 
Rocinha UPP, will open up the community for the state to enter with services.
24
 While the 
state sees security as a precondition for development, the residents do not necessarily 
prioritize the same way. In Vidigal, a favela located next to Rocinha in the south zone of the 
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city, a study conducted before the community was pacified showed that the residents put 
security in the sixth place over urgent needs in the community, behind other priorities such as 
infrastructure, education, health and leisure (Oliveira 2012: 53). As with the study from 
Vidigal, the residents of Rocinha that I talked to throughout my stay all claimed that the most 
urgent needs of the community continue to be, as they were before the pacification, health, 
education and sanitation. Not security. Actually, many feel that the security situation has 
gotten worse since the pacification, which I will come back to. 
With security seen as state control over the means of coercion, insecurity in the informal 
settlements builds on assumptions about the weakness of the Brazilian state and the failure of 
public institutions. As such, there is a sense of competition over the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of violence and of the state failing to deliver security as a public good. Tilly 
(1985) would however have pointed out that one should not confuse violence by non-state 
actors as non-state violence. As Arias (2006) also argues, the high level of violence in the 
favelas is a result of state complicity, not state absence. Police practices of extortion, 
negotiation and dealings with the traffickers are among the principal reasons why violent 
crime surged in the favelas, disqualifying the arguments of the public security apparatus about 
the “war” that should be conducted against these territories (Machado da Silva and Leite 
2008: 63).  
Charles Tilly has written extensively about the relationship between violence and the state. 
The key question for Tilly was always “what does violence do”, and from this, he considered 
the subsidiary question “whose interests does it serve” (Jones and Rodgers 2011: 984). 
According to Tilly, violence is best understood as concerning social ties, within structural 
conditions (Tilly 2005). If we ask, like Tilly, what violence does, violence in the favelas was 
often an end game to a process of dispute resolution, either between drug factions for control 
over territory or with the police or the military. Such violence is undoubtedly often terrifying 
and has many innocent victims. However, violence rarely occurs without rules or on a zero-
sum basis. Violence in the case of the drug traffickers was clearly a tool of governance that 
incorporated behavioral norms, welfare distribution and conflict resolution (Jones and 
Rodgers 2011: 990).  
The “law of the trafficker” was a system of governance that grew over the years and was 
present where the state was absent, a system with clear rules and consequences that would not 
only oppress but would also support and help the community. While the “law of the 
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trafficker” was brutal, many saw it as just. The traffickers upheld a zero tolerance on 
robberies, assaults and sexual violence towards women, among other things. The rules were 
clear, and people knew the consequences. According to a former drug trafficker from 
Rocinha;
25
 “if somebody had a robbery, or if a woman was beaten by her husband, they could 
go to the traffickers who would gather witnesses for a trial. If the defendant was found guilty, 
he was banished from the community or shot.” There were therefore very low indices of 
crime in the community. In the words of another resident; “In Rocinha, the level of violence 
was zero.”26  
The traffickers, often born and raised in the favela, had strong connections to the local 
community. They would reinvest some of the surplus in the community; paving roads, 
constructing community centers and aiding some of the poorest residents by providing food 
and necessities. In return, people gave their loyalty and kept their mouths shut. The drug lord 
in Rocinha the last 6 years, Nem, was therefore a highly popular leader:  
“Many saw him as an idol. Nem He was everything to them. Why everything? Because 
that child grew up knowing that Nem helped the grandmother that was about to die, that child 
grew up knowing that Nem bought milk when the family couldn’t. (…) if you needed medicine, 
the traffickers would come. If a person from the community would die, and the family didn’t 
have the money to pay for a funeral, the traffickers did. Who did the social work for the whole 
community? The traffickers.”27 
”I’m not telling you that the drug trafficking was right. The law is the law, what is 
right is right. But in a certain way, for those who were attended, marvelous. What is it the 
people want? Attention.”28  
The most unfair violence in the eyes of the residents was the “lost bullets” striking innocents 
in shoot-outs and the violence of the police. While the traffickers had close knit bonds to the 
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 Interview with a former president of the AMABB Residents’ Association on December 5
th
 2012. With the 
alleged bonds between the AMs and the drug traffickers, one could question the possible biases in this 
statement. Later in the interview, he said he had been childhood friends with the former drug lord Nem. 
However, throughout numerous conversations with residents I was told how the violence under Nem in their 
eyes had been "justified" compared to police violence. While the level of violence certainly wasn’t “zero” this 
statement seems to incorporate the perceived difference between police violence and the violence of the 
traffickers. 
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 Interview with Luiz, December 5
th
 2012. While Luiz had personal bonds with Nem, I talked to numerous other 
people about how the level of violence had been lower under Nem. Do the residents want the drug lords back? 
Not necessarily. Nem was only the leader for 6 years, and the so-called drug wars between different factions at 
the turn of the century were a bloody affair that nobody wants to go back to. These statements can seem in 
relation to a frustration over the UPP Police that is not living up to the expectations of being a more civilized 
police force. People view the “past in terms of the present”.  
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community and only hurt those who clearly went against their rules, police violence was 
perceived as despotic, arbitrary and irrational. The police practice shaped by the logic of war 
was an aggressive approach where they would enter the favela seeking confrontation. Often 
counting on the element of surprise, they would be met by resistance from the traffickers 
resulting in a shootout. The police would not distinguish between traffickers and regular 
residents who happened to get caught in the crossfire. In their interaction with the locals 
everybody was treated as potential criminals. There was therefore no logic or justice to their 
violence in the eyes of the residents, it could strike anyone, at any time, and the police were 
rarely held accountable for their actions.  
According to Machado da Silva and Leite (2008), people’s number one complaint was not the 
police violence in itself, but the fact that the police did not distinguish between different 
categories of people within the favela. The residents all understood the violent methods of the 
police as a necessity, which can be related to the fact that they were used to a hard-hand 
governance from the traffickers. Their complaint was that the police did not distinguish 
between gente de bem, regular residents, and criminals in their interactions with the 
community (Machado da Silva and Leite 2008: 63). The favela residents’ “aversion” of the 
police institution and their agents has been interpreted as a connivance with violent crime 
within the discourse of war (Machado da Silva and Leite 2008: 62). As we see, however, it is 
not that people made an active choice between the police and the traffickers. While the police 
would enter and leave again, the residents of the favelas had no choice but to coexist with 
drug traffickers that were progressively equipping themselves with firearms in order to hold 
the fort against rival factions and the police.  
Through the proper historic constitution of the police, always withheld from the democratic 
control of the society, the “license to kill” resulted in a power that produced obscene and 
perverted arrangements in the name of “order” and “security” (Fridman 2008: 78). Back to a 
Tillyan perspective, the violence of the police served another purpose than that of the 
traffickers. While the violence of the traffickers was governance, the violence of the police 
operations was to create fear to “keep people in their place” (Machado da Silva 2008). In sum, 
the police action was conceived as opaque and unpredictable, and many residents therefore 
feared the police more than the traffickers (Rodrigues and Siqueira 2012: 16). They could not 
trust a public security that did not include them; in agents of the state that did not 
acknowledge their citizenship, that neither recognized nor protected their lives and rights, and 
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who’s presence in the favela always meant an attack on their physical integrity (Machado da 
Silva and Leite 2008: 62).  
3.1.2 Enforcing security 
The pacification program has changed the public security policies in the favelas from pure 
military interventions to proximity policing combining security and developmental measures. 
The fact that they announce the occupation in advance to avoid armed confrontation can be 
seen as a step away from business as usual for the Rio de Janeiro military police. Yet, this is 
still a war, no doubt about it, even in the way people talk about it (the nine day war of 
Alemão, for example). Already in the first phase of the pacification the link between the 
program and a demonstration of power is confirmed as the BOPE battalion claims control of 
the territory through the use of weapons, helicopters and tanks. While the exceptional politics 
of the earlier hard-hand military approaches are displaced by a softer “pacifying” police force, 
the UPP police are still a clearly a violent power. As the UPPs patrol the streets in bulletproof 
vests with the finger on the trigger of their machine guns, they leave no doubt that they are 
still an authority that imposes their power through the threat of violence.  
The UPP units establish permanent bases in the favelas that they pacify and become the first 
point of contact with the state for local residents, through which they request public goods and 
services. Interestingly, in this aspect the UPP police share a lot of characteristics with the 
policies of the drug traffickers they try to distance themselves from. Juliana, the leader of an 
NGO in Rocinha, claims that the urban upgrading and social programs coming to the 
community with the pacification program are politica cala-boca (politics to shut you up).
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You do not bite the hand that feeds you. The gratefulness, towards the drug trafficker that 
gives your grandmother medicines or the state which has started providing services, keeps 
people in a debt of gratitude. Still, one should not forget that business is business. While Nem 
might have played the part of the benevolent criminal, people never forgot that if they went 
against his rules, the consequences were brutal. In a similar manner, the benevolence of the 
state programs is only accompanying a process of claiming control over the territory. The 
underlying power structure is still the Tillyan hierarchical opposition pair of state-favela 
where the state, represented by the police, has the definition power. 
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 “It is the weapon that commands, it continues the same way. Bermuda shorts and flip 
flops are changed for police uniforms, but it follows the same logic.”30  
Again, the favelas understand and respect the fact that it is the job of the police to control and 
combat the drug trade and that this demands an authoritarian police. Yet, a continued criticism 
is the lack of distinction between criminals and non-criminals. Many, especially young black 
men, feel constantly mistrusted in their own neighborhood after the pacification as the UPP 
will stop random people on the streets to ransack them with the justification of looking for 
drugs.
31
 This differentiated treatment of poor, black men in the favelas is seen as a racialized 
and discriminatory policy that underlines the historic distance between the police and the 
local community as well as supporting the connotation between favela residents and crime. As 
a resident of the favela Borel noted at a two-day seminar about the UPPs; 
“Security? The right to come and go? Everybody has to keep their documents on them, 
never knowing when you’re going to be searched for drugs, be forced up against a wall. It is 
mentally exhausting, leaving home early, going back to the community late, knowing that 
there is always a possibility you’ll be suspected of something. There is still a lot of fear.” 32 
While promoted as a program to spur an approximation process between the favela and the 
asphalt, the UPP police practice in the favelas can be seen as a “differentiated policing of 
space” (Samara 2010, 2011). The pacification represents a police mechanism that is exercised 
according to the spatial configuration of the city. The UPPs are only stationed in favelas, 
while the other neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro fall under the jurisdiction of the civil police. 
The unequal treatment of the favelados by the UPP police compared to citizens of the asphalt 
by the civil police can be seen as a "differentiated management of illegalities" in the words of 
Foucault (Foucault and Miskowiec 1986). According to the Brazilian researcher Sonia Fleury 
“this is not public policy. It is public, but it is completely local. Public, but not really, it is not 
for everybody.”33 Fleury underlines the fact that the UPP police only covers a certain segment 
of the population; the poor residents of the favelas. As the UPPs are supposed to be 
permanent rather than a transitioning police force, such location-specific policing can be seen 
to constitute the actual work of spatial production, reinforcing the socio-spatial contours 
between different populations of the city rather than bridging the gaps (Samara 2011: 16-17). 
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Although it can be contended that the UPPs are perhaps a more sophisticated form of social 
control than the earlier police interventions, they also respond to a long-standing desire to 
segregate the poor from the rich. As such, this practice expresses and reproduces segregating 
dynamics in Rio de Janeiro. In this perspective, UPP is becoming an instrument for 
disempowerment and management of favela residents rather than representing a way to 
control crime in the selected areas.  
3.1.3 What kind of security regime?  
As the UPP police are taking over monopoly of violence in the favelas, it is argued that they 
are positioning themselves as the new dono do morro
34
 or Leviathan in the community. The 
dono do morro has historically been the community leader within the favelas and who would 
mediate when there were conflicts and keep order in the state’s absence. When the traffickers 
started controlling the favelas it was the drug lord that became the dono do morro. The fact 
that he is the dono; the owner, points to a position of great centralized power over who comes 
and goes and what can or cannot be done within that space. Because of the power centralized 
in the UPP police today, Mulli (2011) and others with him worry that the pacification will 
turn each newly pacified neighborhood into a quasi-police state. A powerful symbol on how 
the Rocinha UPP police are claiming the position of authority from the traffickers is the 
placement of the UPP police headquarters. It is located on top of the favela on what according 
to former trafficker Gustavo
35
 is the exact spot where the traffickers would execute people in 
the past, which has profound symbolic value.  
The fact that the pacification is “taking back” these territories from non-state armed forces 
does however not mean that the UPPs represents a clean transfer of power and management 
form one institution to another. This is first and foremost because in a Foucauldian 
perspective, power is not something one can possess. Power does not exist in a fixed 
structure; rather, power is inscribed in historical, flexible relations (Foucault 1979). The state 
presence through the pacification program is more than the UPP Police claiming monopoly of 
violence from the drug traffickers. The police do not produce governance alone. Rather, they 
work together with a diversity of actors that are all part of transforming the reality in pacified 
favelas. Public agents, Medias of communication, NGOs and a variety of other actors are 
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intertwining in the production of the “pacified” reality. The state presence embodies the series 
of projects, interventions and actors that are entering the community with the pacification and 
that generate substantial effects on the social and individual bodies of the residents of pacified 
favelas. What we are seeing is a change from an instrumental and personalized (sovereign) 
power embodied in the drug lord to a more complex non-instrumental and depersonalized 
“Foucauldian” power- a biopower.  
Foucault has described biopower as a regulatory power that controls and manipulates what 
can and cannot be done in a society through intervening in all processes that constitute human 
life (Foucault 2008). Biopolitics talks the language of promoting life and well-being for the 
population, just as the pacification program claims that it is bringing peace and development 
to the pacified favelas. The paradox of biopolitics is however that it is at the same time has 
the ability to disallow life “to the point of death” (Duffield 2007: 34). Even if the hit-and-run 
technique of earlier police interventions to a large degree are replaced by a proximity policing 
approach, the UPP police still have power over life and death, at least in a metaphorical sense 
in terms of control over acceptable and non-acceptable life-forms.  
Throughout the socio-spatial history of Rio de Janeiro, the politics of the state have frequently 
justified their interventions in the favelas with the objective to promote integration to the city. 
The necessity to change values to guarantee the favelados’ access to citizenship is an 
underlying presumption that has characterized the governmental interventions in the favelas. 
Since the days of the “urban sanitizing” projects in the beginning of the 20th century, to the 
proletarian parks incentivizing “better” choices for the favelados and the urban upgrading and 
removal policies, the government has wanted to develop citizenship in territories and 
populations not seen as having this. In line with these historic interventions, the pacification 
program goes beyond reclaiming the monopoly of violence. The pacification program is about 
more than security in a strictly military sense; it is also a project to “civilize” the residents as a 
precondition for their integration with the city. The pacification program as biopolitics is 
changing the dynamics of power and what constitutes acceptable and non-acceptable 
behaviors in the community. Pacifying these territories is done through regularizing the 
sociabilities of all the favela residents, not just the traffickers, to change the dynamics of these 
territories from “factories producing marginals” (Freire 2007) to civilized spaces in order to 
reduce the threat they pose to the rest of civilized society. The devices through which this is 
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done are many; such as discourses, regulations, administrative means and police activity that 
represses activity that is not considered civilized (Leite 2012: 384).  
An example is how the UPP police control the popular culture of the funk
36
 in pacified 
favelas. The favelas have been famous for wild funk parties thrown by traffickers where there 
was a wide access to drugs, people would dance with uninhibited sexual undertones, and the 
lyrics of the songs would glorify violence and the different drug factions. With the 
pacification, funk parties have been prohibited in many UPP favelas with the justification that 
the parties were encouraging criminal activities. The prohibition of funk parties can be seen as 
a way of controlling the impure activities of “the other” in that the police are shutting down 
activities they do not like or understand. While the so-called prohibidão, funk songs with 
lyrics glorifying different drug factions, are prohibited by Brazilian law, the prohibition of 
funk parties in general has not been received with open arms by young people in the favelas. 
According to a funkeiro, a funk DJ/musician from Santa Martha:  
 “The funk expresses the reality of the favela in its own language. There are political 
funks, religious ones and the prohibidão. Funk gets a lot of negative attention because of its 
misogynist lyrics and the prohibidão. But that is just an excuse, they can criticize that kind of 
attitudes, but not the music in itself, it’s not the music’s fault.”37 
On December 9
th
, Santa Marta arranged a hip-hop event, gathering people of all ages from the 
community. It was supposed to last until midnight, but at 11 P.M. the UPP police shut down 
the event which was not popular among the residents.
38
 FGV-researcher Sónya Fleury argues 
that the UPPs represent a “citizenship of exception” in that the favelas cannot have these kind 
of parties as it is not accepted as culture.
39
  
The biopolitical paradox is that that the maintenance of subjective life requires the destruction 
of other life forms. The state not only intervenes in the biological life of individuals or groups, 
regulating behavior to guarantee life, but also controls the potential of life and life forms. 
Certain aspects of local culture (informal organization of housing and services,
40
 funk music 
and parties, etcetera) are banned or reorganized in line with “proper” culture. The state is 
trying to integrate the favelados’ forms of sociability to the dominant culture and norms, 
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making them civilized at last, in order to reduce the threat their uncivilized behaviors are seen 
to constitute to the rest of society. The pacification thus produces biopolitical discourses that 
“make live and let die” through deciding what activities and behaviors are acceptable (Melicio 
et al. 2012). This represents a side-tour from a political conceptualization of citizenship as 
civil rights to a more culturist conceptualization that subordinates the demands for rights to 
the acquisition of a cultural passport, to be obtained by transforming a population viewed as 
uncivilized to reeducated individuals through the teaching them about good identity (Farias 
2007 in Birman 2008: 110).  
While other UPPs have maintained the zero tolerance for funk parties, in Rocinha, the parties 
actually started up again a couple of months ago. They are however not what they used to be 
before the pacification. The big arena on top of Rocinha, famous for the parties the traffickers 
would throw back in the day, now hosts a “peace dance” every Saturday organized by the 
police. Where the old parties would be free, the entrance fee today is 10 or 20 Reais for either 
regular entry or the “VIP” lounge, which many of the young in Rocinha cannot afford. The 
parties today therefore draw a different crowd of middle-class residents from the asphalt and 
foreigners. The security is no longer handled by teenage drug traffickers but by off-duty 
policemen from the Gávea police station.
41
 This is not only interesting because it evokes 
questions about the double roles of policemen in a city notorious for militias. It is equally 
interesting as a project of controlling or subverting popular culture. 
The example of funk music brings together all the underlying issues of the civilizational 
character of the pacification. On the one hand the favela and its culture is seen as dangerous, 
unstable and unmoral, and must be controlled. This is why funk parties were prohibited in 
many pacified favelas. On the other hand, the funk is widely popular, and not allowing these 
parties was undermining the legitimacy of the UPP police. Instead of maintaining the 
prohibition, funk parties in Rocinha were legalized so as to manage this aspect of the favela 
culture. By calling it a “peace dance” it exemplifies how the governance in a biopolitical 
manner is produced through regulation and manipulation. The funk parties in Rocinha used to 
be the prime symbol of the parallel power of the drug lord. Today, they have been made 
“peace parties” celebrating the pacification in accordance with Pelbart (2003) who claims that 
forces of creation, singularities and alternative lifestyles are “kidnapped” in a biopolitical 
game of forced inclusion.  
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3.1.4 New sense of insecurity 
The pacification process produces effects on the individual and social bodies of the 
community that goes beyond the state reclaiming monopoly of violence or providing basic 
services. The presence of the UPPs and the new rules that come with the new governance 
leads to changing power relations and dynamics within the community, which has effects on 
the sense of security. In their reactions to unsocial behavior, the police have to follow a 
different logic than the traffickers in accordance with a state of justice. They cannot take 
immediate action and beat up a rapist like the traffickers would do before. After decades of 
dealing with a police that would not do anything for them, many people are uneasy about 
going to the police to file a report. When I asked UPP deputy commander Medeiros about the 
spaces for dialogue between the police and the residents, he answered: “The dialogue with the 
population is always open, we are here (…) the door is always open to the population.”42 
After decades of police violence, however, it is not straightforward for the residents to go to 
the headquarter of the police to make a demand or denounce an abusive officer, especially 
since they know the officer will most likely be patrolling the streets of the community the day 
after and there is no telling what the reaction will be. For those who do, the solving rate of the 
Brazilian civil police is not the highest. As a consequence, the profile of crime has changed in 
pacified favelas.  
When the police entered Rocinha, a period of increased violence followed. There was a surge 
in crimes such as violence against women, assaults, fighting and robberies, all crimes that 
were forbidden and practically non-existent under the traffickers. According to data from the 
Institute of Public Safety the rates of crime increased significantly in Rocinha from 2011 to 
2012 (Rousso 2012). During the first nine months of the year after the occupation, there was 
an 74% increase in rapes, and a 50 % increase in violent deaths.
43
 Many residents have 
expressed that this is related to a lack of imposing the law on behalf of the police. 
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 2012. In addition, a citywide phone line for making denouncements against UPP 
Police officers has been established. However, both residents in Rocinha and Santa Martha that I talked to 
complained that they had received little information about this, and that they didn’t know the number.  
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 An interesting contrast to other pacified favelas, where the murder rate has dropped significantly. This has to 
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with rival drug factions and the Military Police, reducing the war over the territory. Residents I talked to 
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(2012) article also states. 
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If we go back to different ways of conceptualizing urban violence as done by Machado da 
Silva and Leite (2008: 39-44), crime can be seen as a result of low costs of opportunity. In 
light of this, some might have been opportunistic; taking the lack of imposing the law by the 
force of arms by the UPPs compared to the traffickers as a window of opportunity for crime. 
An example is the case of the nephew of my main informant. The day before I arrived in 
Rocinha, he had been beaten up at a dance by a man that thought he was flirting with his 
girlfriend. He had to go to the hospital and needed facial surgery. Apparently, two UPP 
policemen had been close, but had not interfered when his friends asked them to do so 
because “it was not in their instructions”. The following days this was the main subject of 
conversation in the social circuit of my informant, and many expressed anger at the police 
because of their negligence. With the traffickers, they said, this would have been impossible. 
But today, the police are present and do nothing. What kind of security is that?
44
 After the 
incident, the mother of the aggressor went to the hospital to apologize on behalf of her son. 
The family of the victim however wanted more; they wanted him to pay for the cost of 
surgery. This is a case they could have taken to the traffickers before, they said, but now they 
had no bargaining power, and they did not think that going to the police and filing a report 
would take them anywhere. This shows how people feel like the police are not able to protect 
the local residents in the same way as the traffickers were.  
At the same time, using Machado da Silva and Leite (2008) again, “low cost of opportunity” 
is too narrow of an explanation to explain crime in the favelas, also after the pacification. 
Leaning on the explanation that people are taking advantage of the situation could explain 
some of the cases. Yet, you could also see the increase in violence and crime it in relation to 
the generalized sense of insecurity and limbo that has characterized the community since the 
pacification. For all the talk about the pacification as a long-term initiative, there is no saying 
what will happen after 2016 when the Olympic Games are over and the financing runs out. 
After all, they are just one in a long line of public security interventions in the favelas of 
which none have given the residents a reason to trust in the state and the police so far. As the 
following statements from residents show, people do not believe that the UPPs are going to be 
permanent.  
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“The investments they are doing today are precisely for (…) the World Cup, the 
Olympics. Are they going to be permanent? I don’t think so (…) it is just for a period.” 45 
“I think that- and hopefully I’m wrong- but I think it might just be a temporary 
cleansing until the end of the Olympics.”46 
Rather than permanent, the UPPs feel more like a suspension of routines. This generates a 
sense of insecurity and people not knowing what the rules and consequences are with 
substantial effects on the sense of security in the community.  
3.1.5 Concluding remarks 
The question of the perceived dangerousness of the favela population is about the potential to 
transgress; whether dangerousness and criminal behavior is naturally embedded in individuals 
or groups. It is easier said than done to break with the historical framing of the favela as the 
source of the problems associated with crime and drug trafficking rather than this being a 
result of a lack of state presence and a history of exclusion and racism (Machado da Silva 
2010). As Foucault (2003: 15) inverts Clausewitz’s proposition by saying that politics is the 
continuation of war by other means, what occurs beneath the semblance of peace in Rio de 
Janeiro is far from politically settled. Security is not necessarily peace, at least not in Rio. The 
pacification, never mind its name, is far from a peaceful process. By claiming that the favelas 
need to be pacified, favela life continues to be implicitly seen as an opposition to peace. As 
Machado da Silva (2011) has pointed out, you only need a pacifying police in areas where 
there is no peace.  
While the UPP police takes over the role as the Leviathan in the community, the governance 
produced by the pacification goes beyond reclaiming monopoly of violence. The UPPs 
represent a power that controls all aspects of life in the favela communities, with major 
impacts on the everyday life in the community. While the rhetoric of the governmental agents 
is that they are bringing peace and development to communities that have been under the rule 
of despotic traffickers, the story coming from the communities show a different side of the 
story. The “security” coming with the pacification has so far not contributed to increased 
sense of security in Rocinha for the residents. It is however contributing to increased security 
in a different aspect, which is the topic for the next chapter. 
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4 “Opening up” the Favela. Neoliberal 
Governance and Urban Renewal. 
According to Subcomandante Medeiros, deputy commander of the Rocinha UPP Police;  
“The police is not the protagonist here, and does not want to be either. We came to 
remove the community from the drug trafficking so that the basic social services can enter the 
community.”47  
On the question on what the pacification will mean for the residents, he answers: “Inclusion. 
The process of the pacification is inclusive”. According to the local UPP police themselves, 
then, they are in Rocinha to be a door opener for the state to enter. They claim the security 
aspect of the pacification is merely facilitating the developmental interventions that will 
include the favela residents in the city. This process can be interpreted as the state finally 
stepping up to its responsibilities as a modern democracy when it comes to guaranteeing 
security and basic social services to the residents. In practice, however, the interrelations 
between security and development that are illustrated through the UPP example raise 
important issues concerning the sequencing of development measures linked to security 
provision. Not only is security seen as a precondition for development, the pacification 
merges the two in a way that is clearly biased towards security (Jones and Rodgers 2011: 
991). One can also ask about the rationale behind the development or urban upgrading of 
these territories and what kind of inclusion it promotes. 
 This chapter will look at the pacification in light of a neoliberal urban renewal process. Peace 
and public safety are seen to “open” these areas for the state to enter with urban upgrading 
programs that will include the resident in the city. What kind of inclusion is coming from 
these interventions?  
4.1.1 Rebranding of the city  
In 2012, the Institute for the Study of Religion (ISER) and the Carlos Chagas Filho de 
Amparo Foundation for Research of the State of Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ) conducted a 
research on the UPPs and their impacts on the everyday life in pacified favelas (Rodrigues, 
Siqueira and Lissovsky 2012a). They found that with the pacification, one of the main focuses 
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of public managers and private agents was turning the favela more accessible for the rest of 
the city (Rodrigues and Siqueira 2012: 19). 
In order to produce an image of a “sellable” city in front of the mega-events; a city that can be 
a recipient of resources, investments, tourism and economic gains, publicity strategies of 
branding the urban space gain influence (Jaguaribe 2011: 330-331). In that aspect, security is 
essential. Security is related to liberty- in the possibility for circulation and consumption, and 
Rio de Janeiro’s reputation as a violent city was hindering competiveness. Improving the 
security in the city could therefore be seen as a strategy that could increase investments and 
economic growth. With the changes in urban management over the last decades intensified 
with the urban renewal process in front of the mega-events, there has also been a change in 
the conceptualization of the favelas on behalf of the government. While the hills and 
mountainsides of the favelas were seen as wasteland a century ago when the favelas first 
emerged, they are today considered prime pieces of real estate in the center of the city. As 
areas to a large degree outside of the formal economy they also represent areas of capitalist 
interest. Securing these territories is therefore doing two things: it is rebranding the city; 
making the city as a whole safer, and as a consequence attracting international capital and 
investments. It is also securing the immediate locality of the favela attracting market forces 
and investments into the pacified favelas. Although the increased access to public services 
and infrastructure are vital for the improvement of the quality of life of the residents, these 
interventions are doing a specific symbolical work with impacts that reach beyond security or 
higher standard of living in the immediate locality.  
4.1.2 “Opening up” the favela 
In the city’s Master Plan elaborated in 1992, there was a change in the definition and 
perception of the favelas. The favelas ceased to be defined in terms of value judgments and 
moved on to be juridically described as integral parts of the reality of the city in a 
classification based on legal and structural aspects.
48
 There is however still no consensus on 
how to define a favela. Despite having status as a bairro
49
 since 1993 (UPP Social),
50
 Rocinha 
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continues to be characterized by favela features when it comes to the spatial and social 
organization of the community. In the lower part you can find all the services of a formal 
neighborhood; from banks and supermarkets to gyms and hair salons. The further up the hill 
you go, however, the more precarious the living conditions get. Compared to the neighboring 
middle-class neighborhood of Gávea, Rocinha demonstrates quite different socio-spatial 
characteristics. According to a Human Development Report of Rio de Janeiro prepared by the 
United Nations in 2001, Gávea had the second highest HDI (Human Development Index) of 
the city at 0.89 on a scale of 0 to 1, while Rocinha had the forth worst at 0.59. Half of the 
population of Gávea had higher education, while 20% of the residents of Rocinha were 
illiterate and only 2% had access to university courses. In Gávea, the average monthly income 
was USD $ 2,042 while in Rocinha it was only USD $ 214 (Leitão). Although formally a 
bairro, few residents regard Rocinha as such. A local NGO leader and tourist guide said:  
“I do not consider it a bairro. Look at the big knots of electricity wires, the open 
sewage, the unreliable electricity and water supply. Copacabana, Flamengo, Botafogo- those 
are bairros. They don’t have those kind of issues.”51  
The President of the Residents’ Association UPMMR similarly claimed that:  
“To say that Rocinha is a bairro is a big lie. Rocinha is still not a bairro. I will only 
consider Rocinha a bairro when it has all the infrastructure of a bairro.”52  
The different waves of urbanization projects and state interference over the last decades have 
placed Rocinha in a hybrid situation, where formality and informality mingle and clash. As 
the majority of the city’s favelas were targeted by removal policies in the 1960’s and 1970’s, 
Rocinha suffered three partial removals during this period. The residents were relocated in 
distant neighborhoods such as Paciência, roughly 45 kilometers west. The residents however 
returned to Rocinha because of its central location and access to services. These removals 
therefore did not stall the growth of the favela. In 1980 Rocinha was selected as a pilot area 
for an urban upgrading program organized by the Municipal Secretary of Social Development 
(SMD). Breaking with earlier removal and urban upgrading policies, this program did not 
include demolition of existing housing, but wanted to upgrade existing structures and provide 
infrastructure (Andrade and Valverde 2003: 58). The Favela-Bairro program that aimed to 
improve the urban infrastructure within the city’s favelas also contributed with improvements; 
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however, these interventions were not able to keep up with the massive growth of the 
community.  
The largest urban upgrading intervention Rocinha has seen so far stems from the federal 
infrastructure program called the Program of Accelerated Growth (PAC
53
) which was 
launched in 2007. Through the first phase of this program, Rocinha received projects such as 
a new Sport Complex, a health clinic, a community center and a bridge designed by the 
famous architect Oscar Niemeyer. Through the PAC-programs Rocinha will receive 
investments for 1,6 billion Reais (Barros 2013). This process opens up a window of 
opportunity to make Rocinha more of a bairro and less of a favela in practice. Becoming 
more of a bairro can mean different things, however.  
In May 2011, The Municipal Secretary of Housing (SMH) and the Instituto Pereira Passos 
(IPP) conducted a study which concluded that 44 of the city’s favelas would pass to be 
classified as bairros, because they supposedly have access to the same basic services enjoyed 
by residents of the asphalt (Daflon 2011).
54
 According to Oliveira (2012: 50), these areas had 
not made any significant advances in terms of urban upgrading prior to their change of status, 
and several were still under the rule of traffickers and militias. Considering the present 
elements in the definition of a favela, both in its legal (land ownership) as well as structural 
characteristics (constructions, household density, street layout, public services etcetera), these 
territories continue to be characterized by features that makes it valid to classify them as 
favelas according to the definition quoted in the introduction. So why were they renamed?  
Just the term “favela” in itself carries a symbolical baggage that distances these territories 
from the rest of society. The documentary 5X Pacificação
55
 states that one of the arguments 
given to renaming favelas as bairros is so that the citizens (understood as those from the 
asphalt) can enter, shop and start a business. “They call it a bairro to avoid the stigmatization 
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of being a morro.”56 The reclassification of former favelas as neighborhoods are ways of 
symbolically cleansing the stigma the favelas and their populations carry, allowing the asphalt 
to enter. According to the Comitê Popular da Copa e Olympiadas (2013), a civic committee 
following the process of making Rio de Janeiro an Olympic city, the municipality is trying to 
reduce the visibility of poverty in the city as part of a project of rebranding the city in front of 
the mega-events. The committee uses as an example how the municipality demanded that 
Google reduced the presence of favelas on their maps in addition to removing the word 
“favela” from the names of these territories. Another example is how municipality is building 
a large wall between the highway connecting the main airport to the center of the city and the 
adjoining favelas, allegedly to protect the residents from the noise. Critics claim that this wall 
rather is meant to hide this unattractive first impression of the city from the tourists 
(Consetino 2013). Other places people are forcefully evicted in order to make space for the 
arenas that will host the mega-events, as is the case of the Vila Autódromo community in the 
Jacarepaguá neighborhood.
57
 In the process of making Rio an Olympic city, poor territories 
are being forcefully removed both in the virtual world and in real life. Whether through 
constructing walls to hide poverty, changing the names of the areas from favelas to bairros or 
constructing big, visual projects displacing the original settlements, the current governmental 
interventions in the favelas contribute to a process of “reimagining” Rio de Janeiro and the 
favelas’ place in the city.  
After decades where the name Rio de Janeiro would make people think of violence and crime, 
the city is reconstructing the image of the “marvelous city”. The favela’s place in this process 
is central. No longer mere threatening, dangerous spaces outside of civilized society, the 
pacified favelas are today spaces of economic and touristic interest. An illustrative example is 
the role pacified favelas played under the Rio+20 international climate summit in June 2012. 
While the government had the army and war tanks guarding the entrance of Rocinha when 
Rio hosted the climate summit in 1992, things had changed drastically when they arranged the 
Rio+20 twenty years later. Six months after being pacified there was no need for the army 
maintaining a security wall around Rocinha. Visits to pacified favelas were part of the official 
program, and representatives from all over the world were shown around in areas that just a 
few years earlier had been seen as inaccessible to anyone but the residents themselves. The 
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local authorities showed off how they had regained control over the previously considered 
ungovernable space, and demonstrated the social, cultural and infrastructural services 
residents had received. This shows how the favelas’ place in the social imaginary has 
changed, both when it comes to the threat and the potential they pose.  
4.1.3 Symbolical cleansing?  
 “There was a time when it was difficult here in the community. If you said that you 
were from Rocinha, it was impossible to find work, because Rocinha was very hard core. 
Hard core- it made people scared, just the name Rocinha.”58 
The statement above describes how the framing of Rocinha residents has hindered their 
access to the city and citizenship in the past, because of the identification between Rocinha 
and crime. As the UPPs are stationed in the favelas on a permanent basis, this gives the police 
opportunities to relate with the residents in everyday situations, not just the exceptional police 
interventions of before. New assemblages are therefore being created in the relationship 
between residents and police in UPP communities, which Melicio et al. (2012) claim could be 
leading to a pulverization of the previous dichotomies of favela and asphalt, of good and bad, 
criminals and citizens, serving as a kind of “symbolical cleansing” of the favela residents. 
While a news article regarding Rocinha in the past most likely would have been related to 
drug trafficking and violence, articles about social programs, infrastructure projects and other 
success stories are now reaching the headlines of Rio de Janeiro newspapers. People from the 
asphalt are therefore not as quick to automatically link favelado-criminal as before, and in that 
way it can seem as if the pacification has contributed to the residents being more accepted as 
“gente de bem” in relation to citizens from the rest of the city.  
Even if the name Rocinha does not place fear in people’s eyes like before, that in itself is not 
a process of inclusion. One resident who has family in Copacabana says he will go there and 
they will say- “oh, now you’re all better, right? Now you have it bomzinho (good)?”59 He says 
the attitude of people from outside of the favelas is as if they had been domesticated by the 
traffickers and that they now have been “freed” from their repressors by the police. While the 
pacification has contributed to giving the favela a more positive image which has “opened” 
them up for the outside world to enter, Rodrigues and Siqueira (2012: 16) question what is 
being done to open the rest of the city to the favela residents. The discrimination of the favela 
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residents is not restrained to their association with crime. It is about more than that; it is about 
the highly unequal relations in Brazil and the distance between rich and poor. This is not 
necessarily something that is addressed by the symbolical cleansing of the pacification. In the 
words of one resident; 
“The stigmatization of the favela is nothing new; it’s from before the drug trafficking, 
that’s just an excuse. The discrimination doesn’t happen here, in the favela- it’s down there, 
in the house of the Dono where the maid or the doorman works. Even if the high class knows 
that their employees are living in “safer” areas, it doesn’t change their relations.”60  
People from the asphalt are no longer afraid, but seem to expect them to feel privileged to live 
in a “pacified” community. As a woman from Cantagalo remarked;61  
“When they (people from the asphalt) talk, it is as if formerly there were no services 
here, like there was nothing here, that it is the government that is bringing it now.”  
Not only ahistorical in that it disregards the multiple abuses the state has been an accomplice 
of in these communities, this attitude also ignores all that the residents have been able to 
construct through decades of struggles in spite of all the obstacles that had to be overcome. 
The favelas were not just territories of misery and criminals, but communities with many of 
the services of a formal neighborhood. Today, this seems lost to the outside world; there is 
little recognition of the things that did function before the pacification. The residents feel like 
they are expected to be grateful for what the state is giving them, which are services, but not 
necessarily better than what they had before. An example is the television. With the informal 
gatonet they had access to hundreds of channels practically for free, with the legalization and 
formalization of these types of services they now have to pay 35 Reais per month for cable 
from the private company Sky TV.  
4.1.4 The entrance of the market 
According to the governor Sérgio Cabral, the entrance of capitalism in pacified favelas is an 
essential aspect of the pacification. He has stated that “we have to keep doing construction 
projects, but capitalism has to enter more and more, to generate a win-win situation in the 
community”62 (Schmitt 2011). In the past, it was seen as too dangerous to invest in the favelas 
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because of the drug factions that controlled the areas. Crime in itself was framed as a security 
threat because of the danger it was thought to pose to market-led growth. Through securing 
and “rebranding” these areas, making them safer for outsiders, the pacification has served as a 
door opener for the market and private interests to enter the favela, who now claim their part 
of these territories. According to Samara (2011: 3-4) city authorities in many prominent cities 
of the global South work closely with business elites to implement urban security 
management strategies for the purpose of reclaiming and revitalizing core urban spaces to 
anchor citywide development. The UPPs represent a practice of policing within neoliberal 
governance in which security, its understanding and practice are closely linked to the growth 
requirements of the market (Samara 2010). Following the line of Samara, the pacification 
process exemplifies how the neoliberal state uses security and developmental interventions as 
one coincident process of “securing the peace” in the city in general. The favelas represent 
both an unacceptable threat to the civilized order, which must be eliminated for security 
reasons, and spaces of economic interest.  
In the state absence, an informal organization of everything from television and electricity to 
garbage collection had emerged. With the pacification comes a “shock of order” to formalize 
businesses and real estate as the city government introduces mutirões de formalização 
(formalization task forces) as part of the program Empresa Bacana (Cool Company) (Urani et 
al. 2011). Communities with UPPs have also received a new program called Comércio Legal 
(Legal Trade), which has brought representatives from financial institutions, micro-
entrepreneurs and local business people together to discuss future possible economic growth 
through incentives and credit lines (Willis 2012). David Harvey (2003) has argued that 
capitalism has launched the world on a new wave of “enclosing the commons”. Typically, the 
right to commons is privatized, and services that used to be informally taken care of; like 
electricity, water, internet connection and public transportation, are substituted by the formal 
economy. With the pacification the general informality of the favelas is being formalized. 
This criminalization of the previous informal structures, as well as the implementation of state 
laws and regulations, is a way to include the residents in the state bureaucracy. The positive 
aspects of this process are that people are gaining formal inclusion. The access to papers on 
their property opens up for taking up loans, for example. On the other hand, it has some 
negative side-effects. Residents complain that their duties have arrived before their rights; 
whereas the formalization of the many informal structures and activities has begun, residents 
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still lack access to services such as a juridical body, proper health care and well-functioning 
education, to name a few.  
Making the favelas more accessible for outside actors and interests is starting to show results. 
Businesses in favelas with UPPs are growing 23 percent faster than in the rest of the city, and 
it is the bigger businesses that have been attracted by the pacification that have seen the 
highest levels of growth. The FGV-researcher Marcelo Neri states that: 
“A big hamburger company that is attracted by the pacification and the possibility of 
advertising its product might be invading a (smaller) Brazilian barbeque business.”63  
In Rocinha, residents remark that:  
 “Ricardo Electrico (a chain store selling electric goods) entered a little bit before the 
pacification; one or two weeks. Casa Bahia (another store) entered now. These big 
companies that are coming here, the community accepts them really well, but at the same time 
they are not going to give any benefits to the community at all. On the contrary; the small 
businesses that exist here in via Apia (the main street by the entrance of Rocinha) are not 
going to be able to compete with them. So they will have to close.”64  
“The big companies that enter ruin the local economy. A product in Casa Bahia might 
be 900 Reais, while it is 500 Reais in a local store. But because you can parcel up the 
payment there, a lot of people prefer it. Local business is not surviving…it is not better for the 
community, but people are short sighted.“ 65 
Throughout most of the last century, the fear of o morro descer; the fear that the people from 
the hills of the favelas would descend and invade the city, was strong in the public imaginary 
(Leite 2000: 77). In the words of Matheus; “The threat is no longer of the favela invading the 
asphalt, but of the asphalt invading the favela.”66  
4.1.5 Gentrification 
While rents in Rio in general are exploding because of a real estate speculation in front of the 
upcoming mega-events, the rents in favelas that have installed UPPs have increased an 
additional 7 percent over the city average since 2008 (Neri 2011: 31). Because of their central 
location, the pacified favelas constitute prime pieces of real estate with some of the best views 
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in the city. The tight relationships between urban authorities and private real estate developers 
in the largest and most prestigious projects of the city suggest that capitalist-bureaucratic 
logics steer the machine of slum upgrading in Rio de Janeiro (Braathen et.al 2013: 38). The 
favelas are being invaded by the middle class and tourists that can no longer afford living in 
the other neighborhoods in the center. Earlier they would have been intimidated by the 
security situation, but that is no longer an issue in favelas that have installed UPPs. Tourists 
pay up to 1,000 Reais per month for a small apartment in Rocinha. Compared to areas like 
Ipanema and Copacabana this is a good deal, but when the average price of a similar 
apartment was 300 Reais before the pacification, this has had a huge impact on rents in 
general for the locals. In addition, the general prices has increased by an average of 18,5 
percent in the year that has passed since the occupation of Rocinha.
67
 Many families cannot 
afford the transformation of the area into a regulated part of the city and have had to move out 
of the centrally located favela to cheaper neighborhoods on the outskirts of the city. 
 “A time is going to come when Rocinha no longer has residents from Rocinha. 
Because they are not going to be able to pay the rents, the prices are really high.”68  
This gentrification process has been named remoçao branca, or white removal. Rio has been 
unique in that the favelas are wedged between middle-class areas, whereas other cities 
generally have slums on the outskirts. No longer the forced removals of earlier decades, this is 
still a process of socio-spatial segregation corresponding to a framework of a state or city of 
exception (Agamben 2005; Vainer 2000, 2011).  
4.1.6 Security for whom?  
Not only does the pacification improve the security and reputation in the city of Rio in general 
in front of the mega-events, it also makes the favelas themselves safer for outsiders to enter. 
The UPP police are establishing a particular type of security which is clearing the way, so to 
speak, for neoliberal development in the communities. The pacification is thus situated in 
relation to the shifting meanings of security in a (neo)liberal world and the city’s emphasis on 
economic growth, where the attempt to develop the favelas is through a law-enforcement-
driven urban renewal process. The pacification as such is about securing investments in front 
of the mega-events, both by opening up the favelas for the market and by neutralizing the 
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security threat the favelados were posing to economic development in the rest of the city. The 
worst consequence of this new urban planning, in the point of view of the Brazilian urban 
planner Raquel Rolnik, is the contempt of the poorest and most marginalized inhabitants 
(Carta Capital 2010). Forced removals, police corruption and lack of compliance with the 
institutional framework and civil and human rights are some of the abuses that have been 
reported in the process of adapting the city to the mega-events. It is therefore relevant to ask 
who the security is for when talking about the pacification as a public security initiative. 
Chapter 3 talked about the relationship between security and governance, and showed that the 
construction of the favelados as a “violent other” that has upheld their unequal inclusion in 
the city inherently continues with the pacification. These territories and populations are still 
seen as constituting a threat to the sense of security in the city. This chapter argues that they 
therefore have to be “pacified” in order to fulfill the economic potential of both these spaces 
and the city in general. As the city of exception undergoes the transformations necessary to 
construct the Olympic city, security for favela residents therefore comes second to the 
security in the rest of the city. The biopolitical aspects of the pacification are no less violent in 
its means and consequences than earlier state interventions in the favelas. While the violence 
of the police is not as concrete as before; while the “war” is not as visible, the remoção 
branca, the suppressing of local sociabilities and increasing levels of crime and insecurity 
demonstrates the violence inherent in the pacification as a biopolitical regime. 
4.1.7 Concluding remarks 
I started this chapter with a statement from the deputy commander of the Rocinha UPP Police 
claiming that the pacification is an inclusive process. If the pacification is promoting 
inclusion, it is on the premises of the state. The entry of social services and urban upgrading 
programs seems increasingly to be at the service of the market interests and tourism, to the 
point where the benefits to community residents appear to be a consequence and not the cause 
of these practices. In the militarization of space, the UPPs represent a routinization of a state 
of exception.  
While the pacification might strengthen some rights, it at the same time represents a 
democratic setback in that it puts the right to security (for certain sectors of the society) in 
front of other rights. With the construction work of the PAC projects, many residents have 
been forced to move, receiving little or no information nor compensation. In spite of the City 
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Statute requiring that all urban policies be subject to popular participation, the process 
surrounding the selection and implementation of these projects was to a little degree subjected 
to public insight. This represents a democratic setback not only for favela residents, but all 
Brazilian citizens, as the urban management of the “city of exception” systematically goes 
outside the institutional framework. The involvement of the residents in decision-making 





5 Citizenship and Participation 
The last chapter argued that the pacification police are not mainly an instrument to solve the 
“problem of violence” in the favelas. Rather, they are a device for the neoliberal state, present 
in the favelas to solve another issue: to open up for neoliberal management and economic 
development of these territories. The intensification of the neoliberal model of urban 
management brings with it mayor impacts on the conceptualization, construction and 
execution of citizen participation in the city. 
According to Miraftab and Wills (2005: 201) the protagonists of the drama of citizenship 
created under the conditions of neoliberal urban policies are the urban poor. For all the 
institutional innovations in Brazil the last decades, there remains a gap between the legal and 
technical apparatus that has been created to institutionalize participation and the reality of the 
effective exclusion of poorer and more marginalized citizens (Cornwall and Coelho 2007: 3). 
This is especially evident in the territories directly affected by the process of creating the 
Olympic city, such as the pacified favelas. There, people’s institutional rights have had to 
succumb for the “well-being” of society in general, defined within a neoliberal discourse of 
economic development. This process is however not uncontested, neither in the city as a 
whole nor in the different pacified favelas. I mentioned the Comitê Popular da Copa e 
Olympíadas as one of the civil society movements that accompany the politics and 
interventions of the government and report abuses and violations. The municipal elections in 
Rio de Janeiro in 2012 have been characterized as a political spring (primavera carioca) by 
the student mass where the socialist candidate of the PSOL-party (Partido Socialismo e 
Liberdade), Marcelo Freixo, received wide support and created a public debate around the 
processes the city is undergoing. There are also forces within the favelas that struggle for a 
participatory process, which will be the topic for this chapter. 
5.1.1 Spaces of citizen participation 
The historic spaces of participation in the favelas have been the Residents’ Associations. 
There are also other actors present; like NGOs, churches, alternative media channels and local 
leader figures. The pacification program has also brought with it new mediators between the 
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favela and the city; the UPP Police, the UPP Social
69
 and the Câmara Communitaria
70
 being 
the most central ones in Rocinha. 
Cornwall (2002) and Miraftab’s (2004) have introduced the conceptions of invited and 
invented spaces of citizenship describing the opposition between spaces created by external 
agencies into which people are invited to participate and spaces where citizens innovate to 
create their own opportunities and terms of engagement. These spaces are never neutral. 
Infused with existing relations of power, interactions within them may come to reproduce 
rather than challenge hierarchies and inequalities (Cornwall 2004: 81). Cornwall (2002) warn 
us that invited spaces of participation are easily reduced to top-down appeal boards where 
citizens have no real bargaining power. Rather than dismissing these spaces as undemocratic, 
however, one has to look at the dynamics of participation within them. Miraftab (2004) has 
underlined the significance of expanding the arenas of practicing citizenship to include both 
invited and invented spaces of citizenship. As invited spaces involve both civil society and the 
state, they potentially offer a great scope for reconfiguring power relations and extending 
democratic practices (Gaventa 2004; Rodgers 2007). The “strategic reversibility” (Foucault 
1991: 5) of power relations means that such governmental practices and “regimes of truth” in 
themselves are always sites of resistance and produce possibilities for subversion, 
appropriation and reconstruction (Cornwall 2004: 81). I will therefore add inverted spaces as 
a third category; describing spaces that have gained a different character than what they 
originally started out as.  
As a basis to assessing the current spaces for citizen participation and the dynamics within 
them in Rocinha, I want to start with a brief historic contextualization of associative life in the 
community. Then I will discuss the spaces of citizenship engagement after the pacification 
and the entrance of the neoliberal state to see what bargaining power the residents have within 
these spaces. The new dynamics of participation and dialogue with the government is an 
essential aspect of evaluating the possible approximation process between the favela and the 
asphalt promoted by the pacification program.  
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5.1.2 History of associative life  
The favelas of Rio de Janeiro have a long history of popular organization where several 
informal systems developed within the favelas to keep order in the state’s absence. Churches, 
NGOs and grassroots’ organizations have been active providing social services and making 
demands on behalf of the residents. The most central civil society organizations within the 
favelas, however, have been the Residents’ Associations who have won many political 
struggles over improvements in the communities. The first AMs in Rio de Janeiro were 
formed in the 1940’s with support from the political left, churches, and the state itself (Arias 
2006: 23-25). Rocinha has had various Residents Associations, of which two are active today. 
The first one, AMABB (The Association of the Residents and Friends of the Barcelos 
Neighborhood), formed when people moved to the area for the construction of the Niemeyer 
highway and the tunnel that goes underneath the community. At the time Rocinha still did not 
exist, only the area called Barcelos, which gave name to the Association. As the community 
grew it eventually merged with what today is Rocinha. The second and biggest AM in 
Rocinha is UPMMR (Union for Improvements for the residents of Rocinha), which was 
founded in 1961. While AMABB works primarily with the lower part of the community, 
UPMMR represents all of Rocinha and has been the institution representing the community in 
dialogue with the government.  
The AMs in favelas throughout Rio de Janeiro were created by residents in order to make 
demands and improvements. They had different work groups working on specific areas that 
would dialogue with the community about the needs and bring their demands to the state and 
municipal governments. Together, the AMs in the city formed coalitions; first the Federation 
of the Favela Associations of Guanabara (FAFEG) and then, after the fusion of the city and 
the state of Rio de Janeiro in 1975, the Federation of Residents’ Associations of the State of 
Rio de Janeiro (FAMERJ) (Perlman 2010: 27). These federations enjoyed considerable 
autonomy and had a great deal of bargaining power over candidates for positions in the City 
Council until the mid-1980’s (Perlman 2010: 28).  
Effective electoral competition is the sine qua non of any democracy and critical for an 
effective civil society. If the so-called democratic consolidation of the 1980’s amplified the 
electoral franchises and the party-political competition, little was done to advance the 
construction of a plural and democratic public sphere (Machado da Silva and Leite 2004). The 
democratic opening and the shift from extermination policies to a focus on upgrading the 
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favelas enabled the establishment of a dialogue between favela residents and the state, yet, it 
also opened new spaces for the spread of clientilist policies. Rodrigues et al. (2012: 54) claim 
that the AMs in Rio de Janeiro have been seen by the state as a possibility to politically 
subordinate the favelas. If the state on the one hand would listen to the demands from the 
representatives, they would on the other hand try to transform the AMs into “braços estatais” 
or the state’s right hand within the communities. According to one resident of Rocinha;  
“They were the state’s right hand within the community rather than a mediator 
between the state and the community.”71 
Residents I’ve spoken seem to agree on the fact that the AMs in Rocinha were organizations 
that de fato represented the residents up until the beginning of the 1980’s. They were created 
by the residents as invented spaces of participation, in line with the classification of Cornwall 
(2002: 50) as “forms of action where citizens innovate to create their own opportunities and 
terms of engagement”. Over time, however, clientilist relations started to change the 
dynamics of the Associations. In Rio de Janeiro, a system has developed where the AMs were 
able to acquire public services through what is referred to as político da bica d’agua. This is a 
clientilistic practice where a politician with close bonds to the community would guarantee 
some improvements, such as electricity or the pavement of a road, in return for votes 
(Rodrigues et al. 2012: 54). When Brizola was first elected governor in 1982 this clientilist 
relationship between the AMs and the state consolidated. According to one interview I had,
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he would use the AMs as apparatuses of personal power, promising projects and getting votes 
and popularity in return. The following quote is from a former president of AMABB, and 
describes how he would go forth to dialogue with the state apparatus:  
“I have a direct contact with the governor, with the secretary of the governor (..) 
When we were in the AM we were always making demands, we saw we needed sewage, went 
there and made a solicitation, there was a road that was broken and we would request 
improvements. This way we got to know them, we went there, sometimes we were attended, 
other times not, but in a certain way we became friends.”73  
As the quote demonstrates, and in accordance with Rodrigues et al. (2012), the power of the 
AMs was depending more on the political contacts and personal network of the leaders rather 
than their ability to organize the community to put pressure on public agents. Slowly, the role 
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of the AMs in the relation between the residents and the state was being inverted. From the 
demands being bottom-up, the dialogue became top-down. This transformation of the AMs 
from a representative organ to managers of public resources gradually emptied them of 
political content and transformed a good part of the local associations into representatives for 
the public power within the community (Burgos 1998: 31).  
In the mid-1980’s, with the entrance and consolidation of power of the drug factions, the un-
democratic dynamics of the AMs further developed. The traffickers started paying interest to 
the election of the presidents of the associations and presented candidates for election (Zaluar 
and Alvito 1998: 212). According to Luiz, no one was elected without the approval of the 
traffickers.
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 Several AM leaders have been murdered because of conflicts related to the drug 
trade, latest in March 2012 (after the pacification) when the president of AMABB was killed 
in a drive-by shooting. In addition to controlling the AMs the traffickers also had tight bonds 
to politicians and local city councilmen, and there is a long history of corruption scandals that 
branches well into the municipal/state power apparatus. As an example, both the current 
presidents of the Rocinha AMs and several former ones I have talked to have ran for elections 
and have been accused of using their position to buy votes. Thus, it can seem as if the AMs 
had been reduced to being an electoral trampoline or a space for the individual interests of 
certain leaders, all with tight bonds to the traffickers.  
There have been and continues to be some strong leader figures in the community also outside 
of the AMs, but their possibility of action has been restrained by the political system of 
clientilist relations and the limitations set by the traffickers. There is currently a variety of 
NGOs in Rocinha, working mainly with children with arts, sports or educational classes. In 
general they have small, centralized areas of impact that are not political, and many of them 
are today funded by foreign capital. The evangelical churches also have a strong position 
within the community as providers of various social services. As of today, there is little 
cooperation between these different actors. The leader of one NGO was very skeptical of the 
AMs saying that “I’ll tell you what, I’m 21 years old and I only heard about the work of the 
Association recently.”75 The President of UPMMR, on the other hand, said that “I do not see a 
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single improvement here in the community done by NGOs”.76 The Secretary of AMABB 
said:  
“We do not have a close relationship (with the NGOs). We don’t try to get in contact 
with them a lot, because the majority are foreigners. They are very... 99 percent of them don’t 
do anything.” 77 
When I asked people if there had been other spaces where residents would organize 
themselves to make demands since the AMs lost their function as representatives for the 
community in the dialogue with the government, the answer was straight forward; “the drug 
trafficking kills”.78 The violence and the fear of the drug traffickers put limitations on the 
actuation of politicians, community leaders and the AMs. As this brief historic 
contextualization demonstrates, the AMs, as originally invented spaces, were inverted 
because of clientilistic relations, the state transforming them to its “right arm” within the 
community, and the drug traffickers. The other civil society actors in the community were 
mainly non-political providers of services, with the exception of a few local leader figures. 
The situation in Rocinha when the UPPs entered in 2011 was thus a fragmented and fragile 
civil society in large part controlled by the traffickers.  
The proximity policing approach of the pacification program is stepping away from the 
discourse of war and police business as usual. The promise of the UPPs is historic: it is 
inclusion. Inclusion however demands involvement. According to Barbosa (2012) a principal 
feature of the UPPs as a proximity policing project should be the joint participation of the 
public in the production of order and the management of safety in the local community. 
Taking Barbosas line of argument as a starting point, the Pacification project relies on 
building and maintaining relationships with the favela residents if it is to be an inclusive 
process. That also means that they will have to change the culture that has grown over the last 
decades where people do not make demands and organize themselves because of fear of the 
traffickers and create a population that knows their rights and demands it. Is that something 
the government really wants?  
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5.1.3 The UPP police and the AMs 
One of the aspects of Rodrigues’ et al. (2012) research on the UPPs was the impact the UPPs 
had on the Residents Associations and associative life in pacified favelas. They interviewed 
people from thirty-eight different Residents’ Associations and according to their findings, 
twenty-five out of thirty-three presidents of the AMs say they have a very good or a good 
relationship with the UPP police and only three said to have a bad relationship. Twenty-six of 
the presidents said that the UPP police participated regularly in the activities and events 
organized by the AMs. The majority claimed to not have lost ground to the UPPs when it 
comes to implementation of projects, although the researchers found evidence that there 
might not have been new projects started up by the AMs after the arrival of the police 
(Rodrigues et al. 2012: 69). Interestingly, this picture is a sharp contrast to what I found in 
Rocinha, where the relationship between the AMs and the UPP police is constrained at best.  
In accordance with the brief history of the AMs in Rocinha above, the residents I spoke to 
seemed to agree on the fact that the process of the AMs losing legitimacy had started in the 
1980’s. The leadership of the AMs themselves, however, stated the entrance of the UPP 
police as the most decisive turning point for their position within the community. According 
to the secretary of AMABB; 
 “They (the police) entered and cut the bond that the community had with the 
association (…) if people have problems, they do not come here anymore. They go straight to 
the police (...) because the police commander himself said so. He said: before, Nem was in 
charge here. Today, I am. The UPP police doesn’t have any contact with us and totally 
discredited us.”79  
Luiz, a former AMABB president, similarly claimed that “Everything today is directly with 
the UPP. They completely withdrew the credibility of the Resident Associations.”80 The 
current President of AMABB complained about the inexistent relationship between the UPPs 
and the AMs, saying he had expected the UPP commander to approach the AM when they 
entered to learn about the situation in Rocinha from the people who “knew the community the 
best”. They never did, which he thinks is because of the alleged bonds between the AMs and 
traffickers. Luiz also thought that the UPP police should have opened a dialogue with the 
AMs who- in spite of having historical ties to the traffickers- also know the residents and the 
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needs of the community. “The UPP doesn’t have the local knowledge,”81 he said. As a 
response to these allegations, the Rocinha UPP deputy commander Medeiros said that:  
“The Residents Associations had a connection with the trafficking. We don’t talk with 
the enemy; we don’t accept an illegal project. So the dialogue is cut off, precisely because the 
Association has, or had, a connection with the drug trafficking. It is impossible to work 
together with illegality.”82 
As we can see, the relationship with AMABB and the UPP is non-existent. I also interviewed 
the president of the other Residents Association UPMMR, who agreed to talk to me on certain 
conditions; saying “I will not talk about the pacification or politics.” He had recently been 
involved in scandal when he ran for city councilman and was charged of having connections 
with the traffickers and buying votes. I therefore did not get any concrete information from 
UPMMR about their relationship with the police, but from what he did not say, the attitude of 
the police, and from what residents have commented, UPMMR seems to have lost influence 
after the pacification as well.  
Rafael, the leader of an alternative media channel within Rocinha, claimed that there is no 
longer a need for the AMs in Rocinha. As the historic role of the AMs to a large degree had 
been reduced to being a mediator between the state and the traffickers, they to a certain degree 
lost their function with the pacification as other mediators have entered. While they might not 
have had been very representative the last decades, they were still a space for some social 
programs and services that was important for the community.  
“Today, the role of the AM, we have social services (...) to know if the children are 
studying, if that person needs anything, there are people here that don’t have any documents, 
and that doesn’t know how to get them, we (...) help that person get his or her documents. We 
also have a list over job vacancies here; we have a partnership with companies.”83 
AMABB provide similar services as UPMMR. However, they complain about lack of 
resources and legitimacy since the entrance of the UPPs which is seriously undermining the 
work they used to do. In the words of the secretary of AMABB:  
“For all the projects that we had, that were in execution, they (the police) are trying to 
shut them down. Take the children out of the classes, precisely to discredit us. We had a 
cultural calendar, we had ballet, dance, and martial arts, lawyers who were experts in civil 
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rights, criminal justice and labor (...) and look how the place is now
84
 (…) the projects we 
had in the community that were working, that were the AM, they stopped. We used to 
distribute food baskets, vegetables, medicines, (…) everything with our own means. As soon 
as the UPP arrived, it all ended.”85  
TIM, a cell phone company, had been supporting AMABB with 20,000 Reais per month. 
Other actors, such as local businesses, would also support the AMs financially. When the 
UPP entered and the AMs lost legitimacy they lost resources as well, as the private donors no 
longer wanted to be associated with the discredited associations.  
5.1.4 New spaces of dialogue: the UPP Social  
While state-society relations are at the core for the understanding of embeddedness for the 
politics of the developmental state, the state’s most crucial interlocutor- civil society- is 
according to Evans and Heller (forthcoming) the most ambiguous and ambivalent of actors. 
Civil society actors are not inherently democratizing, and can do anything from expand right-
based conceptions of democratic inclusion, serve as an extension of state hegemony, or 
devolve into involuntary forms of retrenchment (Evans and Heller forthcoming). Tilly (2004) 
agrees that not all social movements are democratic, often making demands in the name of 
particularized conceptions of “the people”. He nonetheless claims that they have 
democratizing effects: “Social movements assert popular sovereignty (...) the stress on 
popular consent fundamentally challenges divine right to kingship. Social movements pose a 
crucial question: do sovereignty and its accumulated wisdom lie in the legislature or in the 
people it claims to represent?” (Tilly 2004: 13). 
Heller and Evans and Tilly underline the importance of having an active civil society. With 
the pacification program the AMs have lost their privileged position in the community as the 
mediator between the community and the government. The government has supported the 
creation of new spaces of citizen participation in accordance with the institutional framework 
demanding participatory governance. However, one cannot assume that these “new 
democratic spaces” it will automatically become a “space for change” (Cornwall and Coelho 
2007) where the residents can realize their rights and claim substantive citizenship. That will 
depend on dynamics of participation within them. 
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 is the government’s response to a space for dialogue with the residents of 
pacified favelas. This municipal program has the explicit objective of coordinating the 
interventions of the various organs of the municipality in pacified communities and promote 
partnership with the state and federal governments, as well as the private sector and the civil 
society, to execute social programs (Leite 2012: 383). According to the official webpage of 
the program, the UPP Social has three main objectives; i: contribute to the consolidation of 
peace and the promotion of local citizenship in the pacified territories; ii: promote urban, 
social and economic development and iii: carry out the full integration of these areas with the 
rest of the city (UPP Social Programa).  
The UPP Social of Rocinha was inaugurated on November 1
st 
2012. The president of the 
Pereira Passos Institute and coordinator of the UPP Social program, Eduarda La Rocque, 
opened the meeting by saying that: “Today, with this dialogue, we are going to show the 
activities that have already been carried out in Rocinha, as well as hear the demands of the 
local population”. According to Leite (2012), residents have two main criticisms to the UPP 
Social, the first one being that it is not very efficient in promoting a real articulation between 
the diverse institutions and the residents. The Rocinha UPP Social meeting was held during 
the day on a weekday, which made it difficult for people to attend even if they had wanted to. 
The form of the meeting was a board of governmental agents that talked through most of the 
meeting about the projects and services in the community, and then there was room for 
comments from residents in the end. Keeping in mind that Rocinha has close to 200,000 
inhabitants by unofficial counts, this can hardly be called a participatory space. A resident 
from the favela Cantagalo stated the following about the experience with the UPP Social in 
Cantagalo:  
 “The UPP Social doesn’t open up for discussing the budget with the communities. 
People need to participate, have control over the budget, know how much the projects costs, 
we need transparency and control over the public budget. But in Brazil that is always lacking, 
leading to corruption and lack of transparency. This is not democratic.”87 
Spaces for public involvement become sites for citizen participation only when citizens gain 
meaningful opportunities to exercise voice and hold to account those who invite them to 
participate. This represents the difference between spaces where participation is reduced to 
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top-down appeal board to inform residents about decisions already made, or spaces of bottom-
up citizen participation where the residents are actively involved in the selection and 
formation of projects and programs in their community (Cornwall 2002). In practice, the UPP 
Social as of now represents a top-down appeal board or a pure informational space that 
informs the residents what projects are selected on their behalf. This becomes even clearer in 
the light of the following statement by the Secretary of Security Beltrame as quoted in Leite 
(2012: 384):  
“I have received and visited the residents of these communities frequently. There is a 
tremendous social debt that stems from the colonization of these lands. The majority are 
blacks, browns, mulattos, poor and very poor. There are deficiencies so big that it is 
necessary to help them to ask, because it is difficult for them to prioritize emergencies.” 
The last sentence; that they need help to choose because it is difficult for them to prioritize, 
does according to Leite reveal the implicit meaning of the pacification program. The 
pacification program is not only about needs and emergencies, but equally about making the 
favelado a future citizen through disciplining and civilizing the residents into making better 
choices when it comes to what kind of demands they make, how they behave and what 
constitutes civilized behavior. 
5.1.5 The PAC-projects and participation 
Not only allowing but encouraging community input in the projects and interventions coming 
to the communities could help the UPPs build relationships with residents and gain legitimacy 
in the community. However, as it is difficult for the residents to make the “right” choices, 
their access to decision-making processes is limited. As chapter 4 demonstrated, the PAC 
interventions can be seen in light of a framework of neoliberal urban renewal. The 
favourization of the kind of “statement” projects that have been prioritized have been a topic 
of debate in the communities, as has the process of selecting the projects for implementation.  
The Câmara Communitaria is a chamber that was created by the neighborhoods of Gávea, 
Rocinha and São Conrado to accompany the PAC 1 projects in 2007. It consisted of 
participants from neighborhood associations, NGOs, local leaders and governmental agents. I 
have received ambiguous reports as to how this worked; some claimed it represented a space 
for dialogue while others said they had no real decisive power over the projects selected nor 
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over the budget. As one resident complained, the projects that are destined towards Rocinha 
did not go through a process of real dialogue with the community:  
 “The dialogue between the state and the residents, they don’t do that. For example, if 
there is a project, PAC 2, I think they should have an assembly, with a group of residents, 
invite residents from the community to discuss issues of interest for the PAC 2 with residents 
from Rocinha. They don’t do that. They have a finished package; this is what we are going to 
bring to Rocinha. Sometimes what they send to Rocinha is not needed here. There are other 
priorities. Today, for example, Rocinha has the highest indices of Tuberculosis in Brazil. I ask 
you, where is the prioritization of health?”88 
The PAC 1 was placed on hold in 2011 when roughly 70% of the work had been completed; 
yet the public authorities had exceeded the initial budget by about 35% (Daflon and Berta 
2011). When the PAC 1 ran out of money it was the kindergarten and sewage the community 
had been promised that were down prioritized. Residents claim the government is failing to 
address the most urgent needs of the community; such as inadequate garbage collection, water 
access, sewage and public transportation. Many residents have expressed concern that they 
are bringing in big, visual projects to revitalize the area and make it more attractive for the 





 worries that the different projects are simply status projects the government 
is using to boast to the rest of the country and the world how they are investing in the poor in 
the favelas. He uses the 18 million Reais Niemeyer Bridge as an example, which connects 
Rocinha to the Sport Complex across the highway.
91
 As Brazil’s most famous architect and 
the master mind behind the urban planning of the capital Brasilia, any project with 
Niemeyer’s name on it is bound to draw attention. Gabriel says they could have built a simple 
bridge for a fraction of the price and spent the rest of the money on the more “boring” but at 
the same time urgent needs of the community. There is an open gutter running past the Sport 
Complex and the new bridge where the stench of sewage is strong. But as he ironically 
pointed out; nobody could see that on the inauguration pictures. According to the residents of 
Rocinha; 
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the budgeting, the prestige projects are taking an unproportional amount of the resources when taking into 
consideration the precariousness of these needs.  
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 See Appendix for picture. 
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 “In Rocinha there are public services. There are schools, the sport complex, the UPA 
(health clinic), police, the library/community center. The problem is that in itself, these are 
just empty buildings. It is not enough that the state constructs these nice buildings. A library 
is nothing but a book deposit unless one works actively to go out and involve the community, 
get them to use it. (..) They do the inauguration; show pictures in the media, say look what we 
build here! But if the services don’t work, if people feel like they are discriminated and not 
listened to at the UPA, if they never use the library, it is not really a service.”92 
“We have for example the library of Rocinha. I think it is a governmental program 
that is very... we use a term: para ingles ver.”93 
Para ingles ver is a Brazilian expression saying that something is just for the sake of 
appearances. That is an expression that frequently was used by the residents when talking 
about the projects that had come to the community. They come as a “finished package” 
designed by agents from the outside that appear to have a specific agenda in their selection of 
programs in terms of rebranding the area. The remaining PAC 1 projects are about to be 
initiated along with it the second phase of the program; the PAC 2. The biggest investment of 
the PAC 2 will be the implementation of a cable car after the model of the one constructed in 
the Complexo Alemão.
94
 It is estimated that the cable car will use up to 70 percent of the 750 
million set aside for PAC 2 and it will do very little to better the quality of life for Rocinha’s 
residents. What it will do, however, is portray a more positive image of the community to the 
outside.  
5.1.6 Participation as a spatial practice 
Foucault argues that “space is fundamental in an exercise of power” (1984: 252). Making 
available, claiming and taking up spaces therefore need to be seen as acts of power. Lefebvre 
(1991) has similarly pointed out that the “spatial practices” associated with notions like 
empowerment and participation constitute and are constituted by particular ways of thinking 
about society and are in themselves acts of power. “Space is a social product… it is not 
simply “there”, a neutral container waiting to be filled, but is a dynamic, humanly constructed 
means of control, and hence of domination, of power” (Ibid.: 24). Cornwall (2002: 50) argues 
that spatial practices like community meetings and community action plans do not just 
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 Interview with Matheus, November 13th 2012 
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 The cable car in Alemão has been widely criticized for being a showcase for tourists rather than what the 
residents themselves would have chosen, and there was no involvement of the residents in the planning. So far 
the cable car plans in Rocinha have not been discussed with the residents there either. 
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presuppose its existence; they perform and in some senses create it. Those who engage in 
these practices, who make and fill particular spaces, are positioned actors. Discourses of 
participation make available particular subject positions for participants to take up, bounding 
the possibilities for agency (Ibid.).  
When residents make demands, it is not enough that the demands are legitimate; they have to 
be perceived as legitimate, meaning that they are vocalized by persons that are recognized as 
legitimate actors. The favela residents’ accept as legitimate participants in the public debate 
has historically been limited because of their association with poverty, crime and 
“uncivilness” in the social imaginary. Historical bonds between the AMs and drug traffickers 
contributed to undermine their independence and legitimacy in the eyes of the authorities 
(Perlman 2010). At the same time, other actors (national and international NGOs, policy 
makers, businessmen, researchers, UPP Social and so on) all have their own opinions on what 
should be done in the community and how. These tend to have more experience in dealing 
with the state bureaucracy, and their proposals thus appear as more legitimate than those 
coming from neighborhood councils or local leaders, despite the fact that these actors do not 
necessarily have ground contact with the local environment. Being constructed as 
“beneficiaries” or “users” intrudes on what people are perceived to be able to contribute or 
entitled to know or decide, as well as on the obligations of those who seek to involve them 
(Cornwall 2002: 50). As Beltrame stated that the favela residents need help selecting projects, 
they are reduced to being beneficiaries of benevolent state programs rather than being seen as 
citizens capable of selecting for themselves. What follows is a paternalistic policy where the 
residents are expected to be grateful for what the state is giving them rather than given real 
spaces to actively present demands as they might make the “wrong” choices. This seriously 
undermines the “full exercise and development of citizenship” stated in the agenda of the 
pacification.  
This is again related to the second issue of the UPPs in the eyes of Leite (2012), which is how 
the leadership of some UPPs are usurping the representation of the base organizations, 
becoming the voice of the community. While other pacified favelas have more active UPP 
Social branches, in Rocinha the UPP Social was quite absent; there was only one meeting 
during my time in the community. In Rocinha it is therefore the UPP police that is the most 
active state agent within the community, and whom in many ways has taken over the role as 
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mediator between the community and the state. This raises questions about the militarization 
of the channels of dialogue with the state. 
5.1.7  The UPP police as mediator 
As the state on the streets, or its most visible aspect in the informal settlements, the UPP 
police are the locus of community concerns and interlocutors with public authorities. In 2010 
Machado da Silva (2010) expressed concern that the UPPs would become a way of “policing” 
state-favela relations. Leite (2012) confirms this, showing how the UPPs are becoming the 
spokesman for the community instead of the Residents’ Associations or other representative 
agents. Instead of just cooperating with the community in order to make police work more 
efficient and effective, the UPP police officers are themselves acting as agents of social 
development, doing work that police do not usually do (Mulli 2011). As the AMABB 
Secretary claimed that the UPP commander in Rocinha entered the community stating that 
“before, Nem was in charge here. Today, I am”95 the UPP Commander in Rocinha fulfills the 
fear of Machado da Silva (2010) and Mulli (2011) that the police are positioning themselves 
as the new dono do morro. The UPP Police commander has a position of great centralized 
power in the pacified favelas, which according to FGV-researcher Sonya Fleury is one of the 
main issues of the UPP police.  
“The state is not a person. It cannot be personal, there has to be clear rules. (…) Yes, 
there are police officers that are doing a great job, but it is the system we are criticizing.”96 
The statement was made at the Favela é Cidade-seminar as the discussion revolved around 
the difference in leader style between the current and former UPP commanders of Santa 
Martha. The previous commander; a woman, had been well liked in the community. The 
current one, however, is not popular at all. He is an ex-BOPE commander that was in charge 
of occupying the community, and the popularity of the UPPs has gone down since he took 
over the leadership. This is just one example of how the relationships between the UPPs and 
the communities play out differently in different contexts, depending on the leadership of the 
UPP Police commander. As Fleury stated, the personalization of the leadership of the UPP 
Police is very problematic. It severely undermines the legitimacy of the UPPs if it is reduced 
to depending on the popularity of leader style of the commander in charge.  
                                                 
95
 Interview with Geraldo, November 30
th
 2012.  
96





When state agents claim that the pacification and the interventions are going to be a joint 
project, constructed with the participation of the community, the residents do not know how 
to relate to that. “They are the public power, we are the residents, the civil society” a resident 
stated at the ISER-seminar December 19
th
 2012. The favela-state relationship has always been 
antagonistic and it continues to be so. The pacification program is not a program with 
cooperation on equal terms; one part has the decisive power, and that is the state. At the 
Favela é Cidade-seminar they had purposely not invited the police because they wanted 
people to be able to speak their minds freely. Yet, non-credentialed police officers were 
present, filming the meeting. This presence of the police was highly uncomfortable as the 
violent suppressive police of before is not far in the back of people’s minds.  
The popular participation as of today is militarized, no longer by the traffickers but by the 
police. There is a large amount of power centralized in the figure of the UPP commander, 
where he or she has the power and authority to control everything from opening hours, when 
and where people can throw parties, to what kind of music they can play; as shown in chapter 
3. Pelbart (2003) argues that through creating a regularized regime that control all aspects of 
life, the UPPs are creating new forms of exclusion and exploration. The lack of consideration 
for the residents’ demands in this process because they are not seen as citizens who know 
what is “best” for them leads to the conclusion that the pacification follows in the footsteps of 
the proletarian parks and other governmental interventions that were going to civilize the 
residents and teaching them to make “better” choices.  
5.1.8 Space for change? 
In Rio de Janeiro, the pacification represents a rupture of the routines in the favelas, the same 
way the entrance of the drug traffickers, state removal policies and urban upgrading projects 
have changed the local dynamics and threatened the status quo before. The communities have 
had to readjust to new realities before which takes time, new issues arising along the way. 
They are however not just passive recipients of state policies. As I started out saying in the 
introduction to this chapter, there are forces both outside and within the favelas fighting for a 
transparent and participatory process. Braathen et al. (2013) claim that inhabitants of the 
favelas in Rio de Janeiro have found various ways of defending themselves against removals 
and taking part in local decision-making processes. In Vila Autódromo in Jacarepaguá and 
Morro da Providência the Residents’ Associations have been revitalized by the threats of 
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removal. In a citywide perspective, new spaces of participation and contestation; such as 
people’s forums, committees and councils, have been created over the years.  
In Rocinha, the process of creating representative bodies for citizen participation has been 
slow. After years under the rule of drug traffickers where it was potentially life-threateningly 
dangerous to organize opposition, the residents seem demobilized and fragmented. Rocinha 
has also not been faced with the threat of massive removals such as Morro da Providência and 
Vila Autódromo, which spurred mobilization in those communities. As of today, the civil 
society within Rocinha therefore does not appear as a social collective. There is however a 
demand for participation in Rocinha and some spaces are being created outside the spaces that 
the governmental organs bring to the community. There are a few local independent Medias, 
such as TV Tagarela and Viva Rocinha, who use social media to make demands and 
complaints and spread alternative information. They are active in the public debate and have 
managed to lay pressure on governmental agents. There are also smaller political forums that 
work with young people about different topics; such as Rocinha’s Cultural Forum and 
Rocinha Sem Fronteiras.  
Braathen et al. (2013: 22) underline the significance of activists and NGOs from outside of 
the communities of Vila Autódromo and Morro da Providência in strengthening the collective 
struggles in these communities. There, the local coalitions managed to link up with external 
political events such as the Rio+20 conference and the Peoples’ Summit in June 2012, and 
they have also brought in the ombudsman and other public legal experts dedicated to the 
defense of the citizens’ rights. The assistance from external human rights activists and judicial 
devices has been of significance in Rocinha as well, as an example from the different 
processes surrounding two of the PAC 1 projects in Rocinha demonstrates. The construction 
of the Sport Complex demanded the removal of many residents who received little 
information and low settlements; as low as low as 5,000 Reais. According to Luiz
97
, his sister-
in-law got 11,000 Reais for her house and had to move to Pedra da Guaratiba, two hours 
outside the city, because she could no longer afford to live in Rocinha. When the new main 
road inside Rocinha (Rua 4) was constructed a while later, public defenders followed the case 
closely at the request of the residents. The majority received new PAC apartments on the 
same location, and those who did not, received fair settlements of 40-45,000 Reais. While 
popular organization in Rocinha is fragmented, this shows that there are actors that have been 
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able to put up resistance. Also within the invited spaces there is room for involvement and 
change. 
The Câmara Comunitaria was inactive during my stay as the PAC projects were placed on 
hold. I was therefore not able to participate in any reunions. It is however an historic space in 
that it includes Rocinha and the two neighboring middle-class neighborhoods. That alone, 
people claim, served to reduce stigma and bridge the gap between these territories and 
populations. It has also built up legitimacy with the governmental agents. The manager of the 
Rocinha UPP Social, Edgar de Alcancar, stated that he is initially against having the UPP 
Social as a forum for dialogue between the residents and the government; as “there is already 
the Câmara Comunitaria. The municipality should bring things to the forum, and discuss the 
management of the territory with the forum there.”98 
The UPP Social manager Edgar de Alcancar and members of the Câmara Comunitária hosted 
a meeting on December 6
th
 2012 about the future creation of a Comitê Gestor which I 
participated in. It will have two meetings per month; the first will be an open reunion that 
gathers residents to give them a space to express themselves, and the second meeting will be 
with the Câmara Comunitaria to bring forth their demands. Every month will have one 
specific topic on the agenda (health, education, sanitation). This Comitê will hopefully serve 
as a space of dialogue between the residents of Rocinha and the government.  
“A local Comitê Gestor will be a space for dialogue (…) The Comitê Gestor, via the 
Câmara Comunitaria, will dialogue with the public power. It will reduce the hierarchy.”99 
As such, there is hope that the Comitê improves the channels of dialogue coming from the 
bottom-up. It is too early to say how it will work in practice, but the point to be made is that 
there are forces working within the invited spaces such as to create more democratic channels 
of participation. It is also interesting that the manager of UPP Social is so supportive of this 
project; he however also said that “there is going to be resistance, especially from the public 
power who does not like to be challenged”, summarizing the challenges to create spaces of 
citizen participation that have real influence on decisions made. 
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5.1.9 Concluding remarks 
The neoliberal management of Rio de Janeiro today shapes the “inclusion” that comes with 
the pacification program as a product of the current transformations in the city management. 
The inclusion we are seeing is first and foremost of the territory of the favela, and not of the 
residents. In spite of a framework of participatory governance, the favela residents are still not 
seen as citizens who know what is “best” for them and are thus not given real access to the 
decision-making processes. There is an uneven balance of power and clear desired outcomes 
with the projects and interventions that are coming to Rocinha as part of the pacification 
process. In the end, it becomes evident that there are a very limited number of people whose 
views are accounted for when deciding which realities should be created through the UPPs. 
Decisive for whether it in the long term will prove to be an inclusive process; a process of 
approximation between segregated territories and populations, will depend on whether the 
pacification breaks with the differentiated citizenship that has characterized these territories’ 
relationship to the state. As of today, the favela-state opposition pair however seems to 
maintain. New spaces and mediators are created, but this is not as prominent as the continuity 
of the hierarchical favela-asphalt discourse mediated through the UPP as the state’s braço 
armado within the community. As Tilly (1998) claims that durable inequalities persist 
because socially constructed categories do the work necessary to keep them in place, the 
content of the favela and asphalt categories is evolving but the poor continue to be 
marginalized in the city of Rio de Janeiro.  
Yet, as the AMs were inverted from bottom-up to top-down spaces, there is no saying the 
UPP Social, the Câmara Communitária or other spaces of favela-government dialogue cannot 
become spaces of democratic participation. The pacification program is a process in the 
making, and even if the dynamics of the state is authoritarian at the moment it is not 
uncontested. How this process is going to play out is difficult to say. It depends on the shape 
that it will take in the months and years to come and the adjustments the state, the police and 





Throughout this thesis I have discussed the interrelationships between security and inclusive 
citizenship as produced by the pacification program. While criticizing aspects of this program 
one should not forget that it is widely praised by many people in the receiving communities as 
well as in the rest of the city. Even the most skeptical acknowledge that the UPPs do indeed 
mark a doctrinal and operational departure from police strategy as usual by moving away 
from a heavy-handed approach and instead establishing a permanent police presence in the 
communities. The pacification has led to a drop in violence and murder rates, both in pacified 
favelas and nearby neighborhoods. The UPP police recruits receive training in civil and 
human rights, and the military academy is currently rushing to train recruits ahead of the 
mega-events when Rio de Janeiro will be on display to the entire world. By that time it is 
estimated that the city will have more UPP police officers than conventional military police. 
This is a significant step forward compared to previous attempts at police reform that only 
involved a handful of police officers, and leaves hope that it will not be just a temporarily 
security fix but rather translate into a permanent governance approach. People have expressed 
hope that the pacification will lead to the breaking down of old stereotypes and resentment 
between police and residents in the long run as they now have to coexist on a daily basis. 
Without “throwing the baby out with the bath water” it is however important to criticize the 
less savory aspects of the program and the effects it produces because it is possible- and 
necessary- to transform and improve the UPPs.  
Returning to my initial research questions i) how do the residents of a pacified favela as of 
today consider the program and its effects on security and their sense of citizenship and ii) 
does the pacification program in their eyes represent a step towards inclusion of the favela 
and its residents in the city on more equal terms, I will try to summarize my findings.  
6.1.1 Security for whom? 
The pacification of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro is not an ahistorical program, but must be 
seen in relation to the historic relations between the favela and the city, shifting perceptions of 
security in today’s globalized world and the ongoing process of neoliberal urban renewal in 
Rio de Janeiro. It would be difficult to discuss the pacification as a public security program 
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without taking into consideration the ongoing project of making Rio de Janeiro an Olympic 
city that has been instrumental in bringing forth financing and political support for this 
program. Seeing the pacification in light of this multifaceted background brings forth the 
processes that influence the program on an ideological plan as well as giving a framework to 
interpret the effects it produces both in the affected communities and in a citywide 
perspective.  
In Rio de Janeiro, the favelas slated for pacification are part of the central urban landscape, 
but have always been seen as a world apart. The violence and crime related to the drug 
trafficking in these favelas was however not confined to these territories but “spilled” over to 
the asphalt, creating fear and insecurity in the whole city. As heavy-handed police 
interventions were losing political support and had not proved efficient in combating the 
violence and insecurity in the city, the pacification program was created as a new approach. 
Through combining proximity policing, social programs and urban development projects in 
strategic favelas, the program aims to improve security in the city as a whole while promoting 
an approximation process between the pacified favelas and the rest of the city.  
Some of the residents in pacified favelas are indeed benefiting from this program. The 
government is investing an historic amount in pacified favelas through PAC. These urban 
interventions are intended to bridge the gap between the services offered in the favelas and the 
rest of the city. As such, the Sport Complex is historic in that it attends residents from both 
Rocinha and the middle-class neighborhood of São Conrado. However, the residents 
complain about their lack of access to decision-making processes in the selection of these 
projects. The residents are not given substantial room to influence the things coming to their 
community radically transforming the reality because they are still not seen as citizens who 
know what is “best” for them  
The neoliberal urban management in the city is challenging the institutional framework of 
participatory governance. The city of exception and strategic planning process is undermining 
the access to inclusive governance, not just for the favela residents but for the residents of the 
city as a whole. However, those who experience the most dramatic consequences of the 
neoliberal development are the urban poor, through a process of social, spatial and political 
exclusion. The revitalization of the territory, the formalization of informal structures and the 
entrance of the market has led to increased prices and a gentrification process in pacified 
favelas as people cannot afford the transformation towards a formal neighborhood.  
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“When they say integration- they are only talking about integration to the market, to 
consumption; inclusion in the capitalist system. They are not talking about urban integration, 
of more citizenship. They talk as if this will be an automatic effect of being integrated 
economically, but in reality it has an opposite effect; as the process of white removal 
shows.”100  
As this resident from Cantagalo summarizes; the inclusion that comes with the pacification 
program is first and foremost an inclusion through consumption. It is problematic if actors 
from the “outside”; such as the real estate market, business that gain entrance to new markets, 
neighboring middle-class neighborhoods and investors involved in the project of making Rio 
an Olympic city, gain more from these interventions than the local residents. Then the 
pacification program turns from being a program promoting “peace and development” in the 
favelas and this becomes the side-effect of a project of capitalist expansion within a neoliberal 
urban renewal process. If the pacification becomes a project of making the favela more 
accessible to the rest of the city- and not in reverse- it hardly constitutes an inclusive process.  
The pacification program is not just reclaiming the monopoly of violence as a first step 
towards bringing services that will include these territories and populations in the city, even if 
the State Secretary of Security and the UPP police in Rocinha stress this aspect of the 
program. It is also a program that has improved the security in the central areas of the city, 
amending the reputation of Rio de Janeiro as a violent and dangerous place. As chapter 3 
demonstrated; the sense of security within pacified favelas has not necessarily increased. 
While the fear of death by “lost bullets” has decreased (with impacts that should not be 
ignored), new forms of violence have surged; such as robberies, violence against women and 
assaults. This is creating a different sense of insecurity. People also increasingly fear for their 
future; whether they will be able to afford to continue living in their community with the 
escalating prices. In addition, the residents worry what will happen after the Olympics if the 
financing runs out and the traffickers come back or militias start controlling these territories. 
This sense of limbo and uncertainty that characterizes pacified favelas severely curtails the 
“security” the pacification supposedly brings to these communities. It is therefore highly 
relevant to ask the question: “security for whom?” when talking about the pacification as a 
public security program as it seems as if the security it provides is first and foremost for the 
asphalt, not the immediate locality of the favela.  
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I started out by stating that what is meant by approximation is not given and depends on who 
talks about it and what interests are at stake. It is too early to say what impact this program 
will have on the favelas’ position within the city in the long run. However, what we are seeing 
so far is that there is a discrepancy between how the governmental agents and the favela 
residents visualize the “inclusion” that the pacification is supposed to bring. Where the local 
residents hope it will open up for giving them access to the city and services on equal terms 
with residents from other neighborhoods, the “inclusion” and “approximation” it has proved 
to bring so far can be seen as more of a process of opening up the favela to the outside world. 
According to Braathen et al. (2013: 10), in the opinion of some civil society leaders in favelas 
in Rio, the ruling coalition wants the integration of the favela territories, but not of the favela 
residents. 
While the pacification is “reimagining” the favelas and their place in the social imaginary, 
that in itself does not lead to reduced inequalities and inclusion of the favela residents in the 
“imagined community” of Brazil or the city of Rio de Janeiro. Rather, they continue to be 
seen as a threat, or more specifically, an obstacle, to the development of the city. The informal 
structures and so-called violent or uncivilized sociability of the favelados stand in the way for 
the neoliberal economic development of these territories and the city as a whole. The 
residents have to be civilized and integrated, not for their own good, but for the well-being of 
society in general, defined by the elite subjective. The pacification talks the language of 
promoting “life”, peace and development, but it at the same time produces exclusion, 
marginalization and “death” in a biopolitical metaphorical sense for those who cannot keep up 
with the changes.  
As we can see, there is still a long way to go before this policy, if implemented from a more 
horizontal perspective, can contribute towards the integration of the urban fabric and to end 
the long-established opposition between the favelas and middle class neighborhoods.  
6.1.2 Questions for further research 
I have wanted to do an exploratory research of what the pacification program as of today has 
meant in the perspective of the residents of a pacified favela, and how this can be connected 
to a wider theoretical framework on security, urban development and citizen participation. 
While I have tried to portray the underlying ambiguities of this process, there are obviously 
many aspects I have had to exclude because of the limits to what a single researcher can do 
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with a Master thesis. My contribution to the field has been through placing the case of 
Rocinha within an ongoing discussion on the pacification program. While I by no means 
believe to have covered all of the issues arising with the pacification of Rocinha, I hope this 
thesis can add to the body of material assessing the dynamics within pacified favelas.  
Approaching the pacification from the point of view of a political scientist, a social 
anthropologist or an urban geographer will raise different questions and give different 
perspectives on the ongoing processes. One of the biggest challenges in writing this thesis has 
been the interdisciplinary character of the master program in Latin American studies. The lack 
of rules and guidelines in terms of selecting the analytical and methodological approach has 
been rewarding in that I have been able to draw from a variety of disciplines. At the same 
time, the lack of rigor has been challenging as I have ended up with both an analytical 
framework and a research method that I had little previous experience with from my 
background in social anthropology. I landed on the analytical framework used throughout this 
thesis through an abductive process where I found it to be what best corresponds with what I 
encountered in the field in light of my topic of interest; the perspective of the residents. 
However, other approaches that could have provided valuable insights could have been 
through focusing on the views of the police or other governmental agents; how they view the 
pacification, their role in the community and the effects the pacification produces.  
Even within the framework of security and citizen participation that I have chosen there is 
plenty of room for further research both in Rocinha and in comparison with other favelas. 
How the Comitê Gestor and other current and future spaces of participation are able to 
articulate the residents’ view in dialogue with the governmental agents in the process of 
deciding and implementing the remaining PAC interventions is a point to follow up on. How 
the relations between the UPPs and the civil society will evolve is another aspect. I was 
surprised by how different the relationships between the AMs and the UPP Police seem to 
have played out according to the leadership of the UPPs in different favelas, which could 
provide material for future comparative studies. What will happen to the sense of security in 
the community as the UPP police consolidates is another point. 
These are just a few aspects that deserve further attention. As the pacification is a process in 
the making, it will be important to follow the process closely in the months and years to come 
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2. List over Interviews  
Name Resident? Theme Remarks 
“João” Rocinha Local activist, ran for city 
councilmen, former 
president of AMABB 
Group interview November 5
th
 
recorded, but background noise made 
it hard to transcribe. Notes. 
“Juliana“  NGO Leader Group Interview November 5th 
follow-up interview November 8
th
, 
not recorded, good notes. 
“Lucas” Rocinha Evangelical Priest Interview November 9th, not 
recorded. 
“Gabriel” Rocinha NGO Leader, runs favela 
tours and a blog  
Interview November 9th, not 
recorded. 
“Matheus” Rocinha NGO leader Interview November 13th, recorded. 
”Sebastião” Rocinha President of UPMMR Interview November 23rd, recorded 
“Gustavo” Rocinha Former drug trafficker Interview November 29th, not 
recorded at the request of informant. 
Informal conversations throughout 
the stay. 
“Bruno” Rocinha Youth activist, worked with 
alternative media 
Group interview November 29
th
, not 
recorded, good notes. 
“Vinicius” Rocinha Youth activist, worked with 
alternative media 
Group interview November 29
th
, not 
recorded, good notes. 
“Raimundo” Rocinha President of AMABB Interview November 30th, not 
recorded at the request of informant, 
good notes. 
“Geraldo” Rocinha Secretary of AMABB Interview November 30th, recorded. 
“Rafael” Rocinha Long-time activist, works Group interview November 30th, not 
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with alternative media recorded, good notes. 
“Felipe” Rocinha NGO leader Group interview November 30th, not 
recorded, good notes. 
“Julia” Rocinha In charge of arranging 
events, head of security for 












 UPP Social manager Meeting + short interview on 
December 6
th




 Deputy commander 








 2013, recorded. 
 
3. Other people quoted 
 
 



















4. Picture of the entrance of Rocinha portraying the Niemeyer highway entering into the 
tunnel connecting Rocinha to Gávea and the Niemeyer bridge.  
From http://architecturalgrammar.blogspot.no/2011/06/oscar-niemeyer-footbridge-rocinha.html 
5. Before and after the PAC- upgrading of the bridge and the façades. 
 




6. BOPE- logo 
 
From http://www.tropasdeelite.xpg.com.br/Brasil-BOPE-PMERJ.html 
 
